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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the State of Utah 
JAMES C. WHITTAKER, 
P!Jamti tt, 
-vs.-
RICHARD H. SPENCER, (in whose 
name RICHARD LEO SPENCER, as 
Administrator has been substituted, 
JOHN EDISON SPENCER, ELIZA-
BETH A. TIBBS, VORD SPENCER, 
IRWIN M. PRICE, SIMON RUGEN-
TOBLER, (in whose place Que Jensen 
has been substituted, INDIANOLA 
IRRIGATION COMPANY and •the 
STAT~~ OF UTAH, 
Defendam.ts. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This action was commenced on July 21st, 1941 by 
the plaintiff to quiet his claim to 60 acres or shares of 
primary or class ''A'' water in Thistle Creek and its 
tributaries. These creeks rise in •the northern end of 
Sanpete County and when not diverted for irrigation 
flow northerly into Spainsh Fork River and thence into 
Utah Lake. 
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Simon Hugentobler was made a party defendant 
because he held a mortgage on a tract of land owned by 
Richard Spencer, together with 55 shares or acres of 
primary class "A" water right in Thistle Creek and 
its tributaries. 
Prior to the trail of this cause Simon Hugentobler 
conveyed his interest in the water of Thistle Creek and 
its tributaries to Que ,Jensen who was subsituted for 
Simon Hugentobler. 
Prior to the trial of the cause Richard H. Spencer 
died and Richard Leo Spencer, having been appointed 
administrator of the estate of his father Richard H. 
Spencer was substituted as a defendant for his de-
ceased father. 
J. Vord Spencer, a son of Richard H. Spencer, did 
not claim any interest in the controversy, except as an 
heir of Richard H. Spencer, deceased. 
The Indianola Irrigation Company is a mutual 
irrigation company and as such distributes the waters 
of Thistle Creek and its tributaries to its stockholders 
who own land adjacent to said creek. 
By his pleadings Richard Leo Spencer claimed all 
of the waters in controversy but during the course of 
the trail it was agreed by his counsel that Que Jensen, 
as successor in interest of Simon Hugentobler, was 
entitled to 55 acres or shares of the waters in question. 
By his pleadings defendant, Irwin M. Price claimed 
to be the owner of 160 shares of the water in dispute, 
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but during the course of the trail he disclaimed any 
right to such stocks. 
By his pleadings defendant John Edison Spencer 
claimed to be the owner of the water in controversy, but 
that eighty shares of the water was to be conveyed ,to 
his sister Elizabeth A. Tibbs, when and if he established 
a right thereto. During the course of the trial counsel 
for defendants, John Edi'son Spencer and Elizabeth A. 
Tibbs, conceded tha1t Que Jensen, as the successor of 
Simon Hugentobler, was entitled to 55 shares or acres 
of the water right in controversy. 
Elizabeth A. Tibbs claims the right to 80 shares of 
the water in controversy because of an agreement had 
between John Edison Spencer, Irwin M. Price and her 
father, Richard H. Spencer, and because her father 
Richard H. Spencer, by a warranty deed conveyed to 
her 80 acres of land to which she claims 80 shares or 
acres of the water in dispute is appurtenant. 
In order that the court may more readily under-
stand what appellants, John Edison Spencer and 
Elizabeth A. Tibbs, claim for the evidence, which we 
shall presently summarize, we at ithe outset claim: 
1. That the plaintiff,· James C. Whittaker, does 
not have any title to the 60 shares of water right to 
which he seeks to quiet title because: 
(a) The mortgage under which he claims title was 
and is void for uncertainty as to any sixty acres or 
shares of water: 
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(h) The decree of foreclosure of the mortgage 
under which he claims title is void for uncertainty: 
(c) The sheriff's deed which was issued pursuant 
to the decree of foreclosure is void for uncertainty in 
so far as it affects the 60 shares or acres of water 
right: 
(d) The deed to the plaintiff from the grantee in 
the sheriff's deed to the 60 shares or acres of water 
right claimed by the plaintiff is void for uncertainty. 
2. That the water right in controversy, other than 
the 55 shares to which Que Jensen is entitled, is appur-
tenant to land which Richard H. Spencer, during his 
lifetime, conveyed to John Edison Spencer and Eliza-
beth A. Tibbs and as such SO shares or acres belongs 
to Elizabeth A. Tibbs and the remainder to John Edison 
Spencer. 
3. That even if the water right is not appurten-
ant to the land conveyed to Elizabeth A. Tibbs and John 
Edison Spencer, they own the right to such waters by 
!'Ieason of the delivery of the stock certificate to John 
Edison 8pencer. 
The record in this case is somewhat lengthy. Much 
of the evidence is not in conflict. We shall direct the 
attention of the court to those portions of the evidence 
that we deem necessary to an understanding of the 
matters which divide the parties to this litigation. 
On June 21st, 1918 the persons who claimed a 
water right in Thistle Creek and i•ts tributaries ex-
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ecuted Articles of Incoryoration of the Indianola Ir-
rigation Company. (See plaintiff's Exhibit 7). By 
such articles it was provided among other things: 
''ARTICLE 5 
The capital stock of this corporation shall 
be $80,000. Eighty Thousand Dollars divided 
into Twenty Two Hundred shares, as follows: 
Eighteen Hundred shares of class "A" stock, of 
the par value of Forty Dollars per share, and 
Four Hundred shares of class "B" stock of the 
par value of Twenty Dollars per share.'' 
"ARTICLE 6 
The purpose for which this corporation is 
formed, and the pursuits and business to be 
engaged in, is to manage, regulate, control and 
distribute the wwters of Thistle Creek, its bran-
ches and tributaries in Sanpete County, to which 
it shall be entitled, to and among its stockholders 
in proportion to their and each of their re-
spective rights to the use thereof, to construct 
and maintain all such dams, ditches, canals, gates, 
reservoirs, flumes and other and different struc-
tures and means which may be found necessary 
or convenient for the domestic and other pur-
poses.'' 
"ARTICLE 18 
.Subscription to the capital stock of this cor-
poration, by •the persons above named, are made 
by each of such persons conveying to this cor-
poration by good and sufficient deed one acre 
of primary water rights from the waters of 
Thistle Creek, its branches and tributaries, for 
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every share of class ''A'' stock, subscribed for 
by him, which said water right is taken and re-
ceived by this corporation at 1the price and vaula-
tion of Forty Dollars per acre of such primary 
water rights as fully paid up subscription for 
such stock. And one acre of secondary water 
right from the above mentioned sources for every 
share of class '' B'' stock subscribed for by him, 
which said water rights are taken and received 
by •this corporation at the price and valuation of 
Twenty Dollars per acre of such secondary water 
rights as fully paid up subcription for such stock, 
and future subscriptions to any capital stock 
of this corporation shall be made only upon the 
above terms. And the Board of Directors shall 
in all cases determine the sufficiency of water-
rights to be received by the corporation for sub-
scriptions for its stock. The waters hereinbe-
fore referred to, include the waters from Thistle, 
Rock and Clear Creeks, their branch~s and trib-
utaries.'' 
"ARTICLE 19 
The Board of Directors shall cause the 
waters owned by this corporation to be distri-
buted and divided to and among its stockholders, 
at the rate and in the proportion of stock held by 
each person, in the following manner, to wit: 
from and after the first day of March, to and 
including the 15th day of June each and every 
year, all the waters owned by this corporation, 
shaH be divided among, and distributed to the 
stockholders of this corporation, both to class 
A and class B equally, pro-rate, and in 
proportion to the amount of stock held by each 
person. From and aHer the 1'5th day of June, to 
and including the first day of March, following, 
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during each and every year, the owners of class 
A stock of this corporation, shall be entitled, 
as a first right, to an amount of water equal 
to 1/40 of a second foot of water for every share 
of class A stock of this corporation, held by 
him, or if there shall not be sufficient water, 
owned by this corporation, to fully supply said 
amount, then such water as may be available, 
shall be divided and distributed to the holders 
of said class A stock, pro-rate and in the 
proporation to the amount of said class A stock 
held by each person. And if, after all of class 
A stock, shall first have been fully supplied 
with 'the amount of water above stated, there 
shall at anytime be a surplus of water, over and 
above what will fully supply all of class A 
stock, as above stated, then such surplus water 
shall be divided among and distributed to the 
holders of class B stock, pro-rate and in pro-
poration to the amount of said class B stock 
held by each person.'' 
On May 6th, 1920 a decree was entered in the dis-
trict court of Sanpete County in an action entitled: 
''Indianola Irrigation Company, a corporation, et al., 
plaintiffs, vs. R. H. Spencer, et al., defendants." In 
such decree it was, among other things, adjudged: 
"It is further ordered, adjudged and de-
creed that for the purposes of effecting a proper 
and economical method of distributing the waters 
of the aforesaid streams through said Indianola 
Irrigation Company said stream shall be divided 
into 1800 shares of class "A" stock, and 500 
shares of class '' B'' stock and said stock shall 
be divided between the parties hereto including 
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the stockholders of the Indianola Irrigation Com-
pany, as follows:" 
Then follows a list of persons who are decreed 
water rights to 1the total number of 1728 shares of class 
"A" water right. R. H. Spencer, who is the same per-
son as Richard H. Spencer, is awarded 448 shares of 
class "A" stock. (See plaintiff's Exhibit" A".) 
On ~~-U.~~y,_23~,..,!9_22 defendant R. H. Spencer and 
his wife, Annie H. Spencer, executed a mortgage to 
Simon Hugentobler on Lot 4 of Section 5 and Lot 1 
of Section 6, in Township 12 South, Range 4 Eas't, Salt 
Lake Meridian, consisting of 77 acres, together with 
55 shares of primary water right from 'the waters of 
Thistle Creek to secure the payment of a note for 
$2577.91. That mortgage was recorded on January 12, 
192?. in Sanpete County, Utah. (See Trs. pages 26 to 28). 
On November 9th, 1926 Richard H. Spencer, who is 
the same person as R. H. Spencer, and J. Vord Spencer, 
Josie Spencer, his wife, H. M. Spencer and his wife 
Ida Spencer gave a mortgage to the Federal Building 
and Loan Association, a corporation, together with 
Two Hundred eighty-five ('285) shares of capital stock 
of the Indianola Irrigation Company, a corporation, 
also all water and waler right appurtaining to or used 
upon or in connection with the real estate described in 
the mortgage. The land described in the mortgage is in 
Sanpete County, Utah and particularly described as 
follows: 
Also: 
Also: 
Also: 
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Beginning 7.61 chains South from the North 
East Corner of the South East Quarter of Sec-
tion 5, Township 12 South, Range 4 East, Salt ' 
Lake Meridian, thence South 89 degrees West 
18.79 chains; thence North 7.88 chains; thence 
West 21.21 chains ; thence South 20.00 chains; 
thence East 40 chains ; thence North 12.39 chains 
to the place of beginning, containing 59.46 acres, 
more or less. 
Beginning at a point 3.89 chains South from 
the Southeast Corner of the Northeast Quarter ~. 
of Section 5, Township 12 South of Range 4. 
East, Salt Lake Meridian, Utah: thence West 
1 degree South 18.79 chains ; thence South 3.72 
chains; thence East 1 degree North 18.79 chains; 
thence North 3.72 chains to beginning, containing 
7 acres, more or less. 
Beginning at the Southeast corner of the 
North East quarter of Section 5, in Township 
12 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian, 
Utah, thence running West 3.50 chains, thence 
North 2.17 chains; thence West 15.29 chains ; 
thence South 1.72 chains, thence East 4.44 chains, 
thence South 25° East 3.60 chains; thence South 
60° 45' West 1.50 chains ; thence West 4.65 chains, 
thence South 0.34 of a chain; thence North 89° 
East 18.79 chains; thence North 3.89 ~hains to 
beginning, containing 7.54 acres, more or less. 
The Southeast quarter of Section 8 in 
Township 12 South of Range 4 East, Salt Lake 
Meridian, ,Utah. 
The land and water right above described were 
given to secure a note for $14,266.50. That mortgage 
l • 
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was recorded in Sanpete County, Utah on November 
9, 1926. (See Trs. 29 to 35). 
At the time R. H. Spencer executed the mortgage 
above mentioned he also executed and delivered to the 
Federal Building and Loan Association a written m-
strument which is in words and figures as follows: 
''ASSIGNMENT 
'' F'or value received I have bargained, sold, 
assigned and transferred and by these presents 
do bargain, sell, assign and transfer to the Feder-
al Building and Loan Association, a Utah cor-
poration, with its principal place of business in 
Ogden, Utah, all of my right, title and interest 
in and to Two Hundred Twenty Three (223) 
shares of class "A" stock in the Indianola Ir-
rigation Company in the State of Utah with its 
principal place of business at Indianola, San-
pete County, State of Utah, and I further assign 
to said Federal Building and Loan Association 
any additional interest in sa:id stock that may 
accrue to me in said stock, which at this ,time is 
unissued and should the same be issued I direct 
that it be issued to the Federal Building and 
Loan Association, and I hereby constitute and 
appoint the Federal Building and Loan Associa-
tion my true and lawful attorney irrevocably for 
me instead to transfer said stock on the books 
of said company with full power of substitution 
and irrevocation. 
Dated this 9th day of November, 1926. 
-Witness. 
David Wilson /s/" /s/ R. H. Spencer 
(See Irrigation Co. Exhibit 1.) 
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The other 62 shares of the 285 shares or acres of 
water mortgaged to the Federal Building and Loan 
Association belonged to H. M. Spencer and Elizabeth 
'l'ibbs. (~'r. 342 to 405.) 
On May 21, 1931 R H. Spencer and his wife Annie 
H. Spencer conveyed to the defendant FJlizabeth A. Tibbs: 
''The NI!J % of the NW% of Section 3, Town-
ship 12 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian, 
containing 40 acres more or less. 
Together with twenty acres of primary water 
right from Clear Creek, Rock Creek and Thistle 
Creek.'' 
That deed was recorded on May 21, 1931. ( Tr. 
35-36) 
On October 16th, 1931 Henry M. Spencer, other--
wise known as H. M. Spencer, Ida Spencer, his wife, 
Leo Harold Spencer and Fern Spencer, his wife, R. H. 
Spencer and Annie H. Spencer, his wife, mortgaged 
1 
. 
to W. H. Hadlock, State Bank Commissioner of Utah 
the West -Halt' of the Northeast Quarter, the Southeast 
Quarter of the Northwest quarter and the North Half 
of the South Half of Section 'l'hree (3), Township 12 
South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
containing 280 acres, subject to right of way of county 
road. 
"Together with all right of every kind and 
nature, however evidenced to the use of water, 
ditches and canals for the irrigation of sa'id 
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premises to which the mortgagors or said prem-
ises are now or may hereafter become entitled, 
whether represented by certificates of s'tock or 
otherwise and together with sixty (60) shares or 
acres of water right owned by R. H. Spencer in 
the waters of Indianola Creek, Thistle Creek and 
Rock Creeks in addition to water now used for 
the irrigation of the above described lands.'' 
That mortgage was given to secure a number of 
notes, one for $2440.00, one ior$4750.00, one for $1500.00; 
one for $500.00; one for $1400.00; one for $1'50.00 and 
one for $5000.00. 
That mortgage was recorded on October 21, 1931. 
(Tr. 37 to 41). 
By an instrument dated June 21, 1918 a number 
of persons executed what purports to be a Deed of 
Water Rights whereby they purported to convey to the 
Indianola Irrigation Company certain water rights. The 
conveyance recites that in consideration of certificates 
oi the capital stock of the Indianola Irrigation Company 
the signers grant, bargain, sell, assign, transfer and 
quit claim to the Indianola Irrigation Company all of 
their rights, titles, interest, claims and demands in and 
to the waters of Thistle, Rock and Clear Creeks and 
their tributaries the respective amounts and classes 
which are set opposite their names, together with aN 
ditches, canals, dams, gates, and all other appurtenances 
heretofore used in the controlling and distribution of 
said water in accordance with the terms and conditions 
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contained in the articles of incorporation of the Indianola 
Irrigation Company. 
Among the signers of 1the conveyance were Richard 
H. Spencer and his wife Annie Spencer. Through the 
words : ''dated this 25th day of November, 1931,'' there 
is drawn in red ink a line. Under the name of Richard 
H. Spencer and Annie Spencer the words "One Hun-
dred and Sixty shares class A stock.'' 
The paper on which the names of Richard H. 
Spencer and Annie Spencer appear is attached to the 
conveyance. The acknowledgement was taken on June 
1st, 1918, before H. F. Wall and shows that R. H. 
Spencer and Annie 1Spencer acknowledged the instru-
ment on that day. (See Indianola Irrigation Co. Exhibit 
5) That conveyance was read into the record and will 
be found at pages 43 to 49 of the transcript. 
On October 29, 1933 Richard H. Spencer and Annie 
H. Spencer, his wife, conveyed to the defendant John 
E. Spencer the South one-half of the Southwest Quarter 
of Section 5, Township 12 South, Range 4 East, Salt 
Lake Meridian, together with 80 acres of water in what 
is known as Thistle Creek. That deed was recorded on 
June 22, 1933. (See page 51 and 52 of Trs.) On Sep-
tember 16, 1933 a deed was given to correct the des-
cription in the deed above referred to in which later 
deed the land conveyed is described as the North One 
Half of the Southwest Quarter of Section 5, Township 
12 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian, containing 
80.00 acres. Together with 80 acres of water in what is 
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known as Thistle Creek. That deed was recorded on 
September 21, 1933. (Tr. 2 to 54). The last mentioned 
deed was offered and received in evidence as '' .T ohn 
Edison Spencer et al., Exhibit 12. '' 
Plaintiff offered and over objection of defendants 
John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs, there was 
received in evidence certain of the files in case numbered 
2888 and in which John A. Malia, as State Bank Com" 
missioner, is plaintiff and Richard H. Spencer, John 
Edison Spencer, Robert D. Tibbs, Elizabeth A. Tibbs 
and others are defendants. Later in the proceedings 
all of {he files in that case were received in evidence. 
(Tr. 73 to 80 and 576-583) 
The files in 2888 civil contain the proceedings had 
m the mortgage foreclosure proceedings by the Bank 
Commissioner through which foreclosure proceedings 
the plaintiff in this case, as we understand his pm;ition, 
claims his title to 60 acres or shares of water. We 
shall not attempt to set out the various documents 
found in that case but shall content ourselves with 
referring to such of such documents as we deem material 
to this case. The files are marked: ''John Edison 
Spencer 1£xhibit 14," but most of the documents therein 
contained were first offered by the plaintiff and over 
objections received in evidence as above indicated. 
It will be seen from the files in said case numbered 
2888 civil that the action was first brought to set aside 
certain deeds. After issues were made by the complaint 
and answers thereto an amended complaint was filed 
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m which numerous additional parties were made de-
fendants and the plaintiff sought to foreclose a mort-
gage on both real and personal property. 
In our view the only part of the proceedings had 
m that case which are material here are those portion 
thereof which relates to the foreclosure of ~the mortgage 
executed by H. M. Spencer, Ida Spencer, R. Leo Spencer, 
Grace Spencer, R. H. Spencer, Leo Harold Spencer and 
Fern Spencer. A copy of that mortgage will he found 
marked Exhibit "G" and made a part of the amended 
complaint. As heretofore indicated that mortgage covers 
the West Half of the Northeast Quarter, the Southeast 
Quarter of the the Northwest Quarter and the North 
Half of the South Half of Section r:el1I'ee (3), Township 
12 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
containing 280 acres, subject to right of way of county 
road. 
rrogether with all rights of every kincl and nature, 
however evidenced to the use of water, ditches and 
canals for the irrigation of said premises to which the 
mortgagors or said premises are now or may hereafter 
become entitled whether repr~sented by certificates of 
stock or otherwise and together with sixty shares or 
acres of water right owned by R. H. Spencer in the 
waters of Indianola Creek, Thistle Creek and Rock 
Creek in addition to waters now used for the irrigation 
of the above described lands. 
rt'o the complaint of the Bank Commissioner 
Richard H. Spencer, Annie H. Spencer, John Edison 
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Spencer, Elizabeth A. Tibbs, et al, filed a general de-
murrer and an answer. In the answer they denied most 
of the allegations of the complaint. 
To the complaint filed by John A. Malia, as Bank 
Commissioner, the Indianola Irrigation Company filed 
an answer and cross complaint. In its answer it admit-
ted most of the allegations of the complaint and in its 
cross complaint it sought to enjoin the transfer of the 
certificates of stock held by the other parties to the ae-
tion. 
Simon Hugentobler also filed an answer, counter-
claim and cross complaint in the action. In his counter-
claim and cross complaint he sought to foreclose a 
mortgage given to him on January 3, 1922 by Richard Leo 
Spencer, Grace Spencer, R. H. Spencer and Annie H. 
Spencer as security for a nate in the sum of $2,577.91. 
The mortgage which he sought to foreclose was on Lot 4 
of Section 5 and Lot 1 of Section 6 in Township 12 South, 
Range 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian and 55 acres of 
Primary Water Right from the waters of Th'istle Creek. 
There are numerous other pleadings in cause 2888 
civH but no useful purpose will be served by directing 
the attention of the court thereto in this proceeding. 
It appears from the recitals preceding the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law that a trail was had 
before the court sitting without a jury. That the plain-
tiff and defendants Richard H. Spencer, Annie Spencer, 
cross complainants Simon Hugentobler and Indianola 
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Irrigation Company were represented by counsel; that 
John Edison Spencer was present in court but not 
represented by counsel and that the other parties to the 
action had been given notice of the time set for the 
trail. 
The findings of fact are in the usual form in a 
mortgage forec;losure. In paragraph 12 on page 5 of 
the findings the court finds that the mortgage to the 
Bank Commissioner was executed. In its findings num-
bered 21, 22, 23, 24, 2'5 and 26 the court found: 
21 
''That the Indianola Irrigation Company, a 
corporation claims to be the owner of the water 
rights described in plaintiff's mortgage by virtue 
of a deed of conveyance executed and delivered to 
said company the 25 day of November, 1931, by the 
defendants Richard H. Spencer and Annie H. 
Spencer, his wife. That on said 25 day of N ovem-
ber, 1931, the said defendants Richard H. Spencer 
and Annie H. Spencer, his wife, executed and 
delivered to said Irrigation Company a deed 
conveying and transferring to said company 160 
shares of decreed water rights then owned by the 
said Richard H. Spencer in the waters of Clear 
Creek, Thistle Creek and Rock Creek. That said 
160 shares of decreed water rights included the 
60 shares of water rights described in plaintiff's 
mortgage hereinabove referred to, which mort-
gage was executed and delivered the 16th day of 
October, 1931. '' 
22 
''That said Indianola Irrigation Company 
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accepted conveyance of said water rights sub-
sequent to the recordation of plaintiff's mort-
gage which was recorded upon the records of 
Sanpete County, Utah, the 21 day of October, 
1931, and said Irrigation Company is charged 
with notice of plaintiff's mortgage. That the 
rights acquired by the said Irrigation Company 
by virtue of said conveyance from Richard H. 
Spencer and wife are subsequent, subject, subor-
dinate and infer1ior to the rights of the plaintiff 
under the plaintiff's mortgage hereinabove men-
tioned.'' 
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"That on said 25 day of November, 1931, 
the said Richard H. Spencer received from said 
Irrigation Company in exchange for the con-
veyance aforesaid, certificate of stock No. 57 
of said company for 160 shares of class ''A'' 
stock of said Irrigation Company, which certifi-
cate was issued in ~the name of State of Utah 
as pledges of R. H. Spencer. That said defendant 
Richard H. Spencer and Annie H. Spencer, at 
the said time and place represented and war-
ranted to the officers of said Irrigation Com-
pany that the 160 shares of water deeded to said 
company on said day were free and clear of all 
encumbrances and that the title of said defendant 
Richard H. Spencer thereto was good and valid 
and that said defendant Richard H. Spencer 
was entitled to said 160 shares of corporate stock 
in said corporation; that said irrigation company 
then and there relied upon said statements and 
representations of said defendant and in re-
liance upon said statements and representations 
the said company issued its stock certificate No. 
57 aforesaid.'' 
19 
24 
"That on or about the 30 day of December, 
H)33, the defendant Richard H. Spencer sur-
rendered and endorsed to said Indianola Irriga-
tion Company the said certificate of stock No. 
57 above mentioned, and upon this request and 
representation that he was the owner of the 
stock and water r'ights represented thereby there 
was issued to and received by him two certif-
icates in exchange therefor, to-wit: Certificate 
No. 72 for eighty shares issued in the name of 
''The Federal Land Bank of Berkeley as agent 
of the Land Bank Commissioner, pledgee of 
John E. Spencer." That said certificates Nos. 
72 and 73 are now outstanding and are now in 
possession of the defendant Richard U.-"Spencer.,-,-·- ·-
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"That the defendants Richard H. Spencer 
and John Edison Spencer, claim, by virtue of said 
stock certificates No. 72 and 73 aforesaid, and 
otherwise, to be the owners of the water rights 
represented by the said certificates. That said 
claims are in each case subsequent, subject, su-
bordinate, and inferior to the rights of the plain-
tiff under his mortgage as aforesaid.'' 
26 
"That said defendants Richard H. Spencer 
and John Edison Spencer will probably attempt 
to transfer the said shares of stock represented 
by said certificates herein referred to unless 
restrained by the court and in case of such trans-
fer the said Indianola Irrigation Company Will 
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probably suffer irreparable injury for which said 
company has no adequate remedy at law.'' 
In its findings the court also found that the mort-
gage to Simon Hugentobler had been executed. 
In 'its conclusions of law the court ordered judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff, Bank Commissioner, and 
Simon Hugentobler. 
As one of its seventeen conclusions the trail court 
in said cause No. 2888 civil says: 
''"" * "" and that plaintiff has a valid and subsist-
ing first mortgage lien, as against each and all of 
the other parties to this action, upon an of the 
real estate and water rights described in plain-
tiff's real estate mortgage hereinabove referred 
to, to secure payment of all the respective amounts 
owing upon said notes as above set forth, in-
cluding interest and attorney fees and costs of 
this action.'' 
"That whatever rights, if any, the defendants 
and cross complainants herein may assert in, 
to or upon the real estate and water rights de-
scribed in plaintiff's real estate mortgage afore-
said, such rights and claims are in the case of 
each and every defendant and cross complainant 
subsequent, subordinate, inferior and subject to 
the lien of plaintiff's mortgage." 
In its Decree of Foreclosure the court among other 
things determined, ordered, adjudged and decreed: That 
plaintiff's mortgage be enforced and foreclosed and the 
real estate and water rights described therein and that 
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the mortgage of Simon Hugentobler be foredosed and 
sold to satisfy the judgment in favor of Hugentobler. 
Paragraph 14 of the decree of foreclosure reads 
thus: 
''That the defendants Richard H. Spencer, 
Annie H. Spencer, John Edison Spencer, Robert 
D. Tibbs and Elizabeth A. Tibbs be and are here-
by restrained and enjoined from in any way as-
signing, transferring, disposing of or encumber-
ing certificates of stock No. 72 and No. 73, is-
sued by the Indianola Irriga;tion Company, or 
the water rights represented by said certificates, 
or any other water rights held or claimed by said 
defendants in the waters of Thistle Creek, Clear 
Creek 'or Rock Creek until the further order of 
this court. The Court hereby reta'ins jurisdiction _,,, .. 
of this cause for further hearing upon the rights 1 /'' 
asserted by the Indianola Irrigation Company ~t 
against said defendants.'' 
The findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree 
were s'igned on December 3, 1936 and filed the following 
day. 
On the same day that the decree of foreclosure was 
filed the sheriff published notice of sale. Such notice 
describes the land covered by the mortgage and water 
in the exact language of the mortgage. 
So also in the sheriff's return and the order of sale 
the real and personal property is described in the 
exact language of the mortgage made to the Bank Com-
missioner. (Note the files in 2888 civil being made as 
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exhibits are not numbered consecutively but the papers 
therein are arranged in the order in which they were 
filed). 
The Bank Commissioner's deed to the plaintiff, 
James C. Whittaker, describes the wa!ter right claimed 
by him in the following language: 
"The right to the use of 60 acres of primary 
water right, being 60 acres or shares of class 
"A" right, .from Thistle Creek and its tribu-
taries in Sanpete County, State of Utah 'to be 
used for irrigation, culinary and stock watering 
purposes, during the irrigation season from April 
1st to October 1st of each year upon lands in 
Township 12 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake 
Meridian, being 'the same 60 acres of primary or 
60 shares of class "A'.' water right of the 448 
acres or shares of primary or class "A" water 
right decreed to Richard H. Spencer by the 
decree of the district court in and for Sanpete 
County, State of Utah in case No. 1406." See 
r_t'r. 97. 
The proceedings had in the mortgage foreclosure 
of the State Bank Commissioner against the Spencers 
will also be found in an abstract which was received 
in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit "M ". 
The mortgage given by the Spencers to the Federal 
Building and Loan Association on the land and water 
right heretofore mentioned was foreclosed. At the fore-
closure proceedings the Association bought in the mort-
gaged property. Thereafter the Associa:tion conveyed 
the water right to the Indianola Irrigation Company. 
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(See Indianola Irr. Co. Exhibit 2) It received two cer-
tificates of stock the same being represented by cer-
tificate of stock No. 84 for 125 shares of class "A" 
stock which was received in evidence as Indianola Ir-
rigation Company's Exhibit 20A. It will be noted that 
the certificate was assigned to Richarcl H. Bpencer. 
The remainder of the 285 shares acquired by the 
Federal Building and Loan Association is numbered 86 
of the Indianola Irrigation Company for 160 shares of 
class ''A'' water stock issued to the Federal Land 
Bank of Berkeley as pledgee of Robert D. Tibbs. That 
exhibit was received in evidence as Exhibit 11. That is 
the 160 shares of stock that was awarded to the appellant 
John Edison Spencer. 
The lancl that was foreclosed by the Federa!l Build-
ing and Loan As~·;ociation was also reconveyed to Richard 
H. Spencer. (Tr. 884, 887 and 889). 
Under date of August 7, 1945 R. H. Spencer exe-
cuted a deed to the Southeast Quarter of Section 8, Town-
ship 12 South, Range 4 "BJaS't, Salt Lake Meridian, con-
taining 160 acres. (See John Edison Spencer's l'Jxhibit 5.) 
This is a part of the property that was mortgaged to and 
foreclosed by the Federal Building and Loan Association. 
On the same day R. H. Spencer executed a warranty ideed 
to Elizabeth A. Tibbs to the Southwest Quarter of the 
Northwest Quarter of Section 5, Township 12 South, 
Range 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian, containing 40 acres, 
more or less. (See John Edison Spencer's Exhibit 7.) 
This too is a part of the property mortgagBd to and 
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foreclosed by the Federal Building and Loan Association. 
Theretofore R. H. Spencer had executed a deed to 
Elizabeth A. Tibbs conveying the Southeast Qua.rter of 
the Northwest Quarter of Section 5, Township 12 South, 
Range 4 East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian. (See 
John Edison Spencer's Exhibit 8.) 
On Aut,'llst 7, 1945, R. H. Spencer also executed a 
deed 'to 53.78 acres of land in said Section, township and 
range. (See John Edison Spencer's Exhibit 6.) 
This tract of land is a1lso a part of the land mort-
gaged to and foreclosed by the Federal Building and 
Loan As::,;ociation. 
The deeds from H. H. Spencer, sometimes known as 
Richard H. Spencer, which were executed on August 7, 
1945 before C. H. Beal, an abstractor of Manti were de-
livered to the grantees on May 31, 1946. (See testimony 
of R. D. Tibbs, Louise Spencer and C. H. Beal. Tr. 819 
to 878.) 
The wa-ter represented by all of the certificates of 
stock have at all times been used on the Hugentobler land 
and the land which Richard H. Spencer conveyed to 
John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs. (See tes-
timony of Lyman Seeley. Tr. 360 to 365 and testimony of 
John Edison Spencer, Tr. 502 to 511, and Tr. 6DO to 635.) 
There is no evidence to the contrary. 
The court may be aided in following the evidence 
as to the ~and upon which 1the water in question was at 
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all times used by referring to Indianola Irrigation Com-
pany's Exhibit 29. 
The triai court awarded to appellant John Edison 
Spencer 3 acres of water for which no certificate had 
been issued as being appurtenant to the land conveyed 
to John Edison Spencer by R. H. Spencer, also known 
as Richard H. Spencer, under date of August 7, 1945. 
(See Tr. 584 to 586.) So far as appears no certificate was 
ever issued for the water that was used on the land 
covered by the mortgage to SJ.mon Hugentobler unless it 
was represented by certificate 84 for 12'5 shares of water. 
We have thus far at some length directed the atten-
tion of the court to transactions had touching the title 
to the land upon which the water in dispute was used a!t 
all times prior to the death of Richard H. Spencer and 
up to the time of the trial of this cause. We have done so 
because, as we contend, the water right was at aH times 
appurtenant to the land upon which the water was used 
notwithstanding the water right may have been repre-
sented by certificate of stock In this connection an exam-
ination of the testimony will reveal that at all times 
prior to the time R. H. Spencer delivered the deeds to 
John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs the certi-
ficates of stock and the land upon which the water was 
used were owned by the same person. 
In the event the court should conclude that the water 
in dispute is appurtenant :to the land upon which it was 
used that would probably end this controversy, except 
' j ;: 
! 
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possibly as to the 60 acres or shares claimed by the 
pla'intiff. 
If the court shourld not so conclude it will probably 
be necessary to look into the evidence touching the vari-
ous transfers of the stock certificates. 
Certificate numbered 86 for the 160 shares of water 
is marked .John FJdison Spencer's, et al, BJxhihit 11 and 
as such was received in evidence. It is made out to The 
Federal Land Bank of Berkeley as pledgee of R:obert 
D. Tibbs. On the back of that certificate is a release 
of a lien by the Federal Land Bank of Berkeley, pledgee. 
'l'hat certifieate comes out of the certificate for 285 
shares evidenced by certificate 81 issued to the Federal 
Building and Loan Association. (See photostatic copy 
of the exhibit of Indianola Irrigation Co.) The number 
of the exhibit does not appear on the same. That 
certificate was surrendered and certificates number 84 
and 8G issued in lieu 'thereof. Certificate 86 is for the 
160 Class "A" stock which is marked: ".John Edison 
Spencer's, et al, Exhibit 11.) Certificate 84 is for 125 
shares Class ''A'' stock and is marked ''Indianola Irri-
gation Company's IDxhibit 20A". Certificate numbered 
86 for 160 shares was acquired by .John Edison Spencer 
assuming and paying the obligation owing upon the cer-
tifieate and the land u!pon which it was used to the Fed-
eral Land Bank of Berkeley. (See evidence of .John 
Edison Spencer beginning at page 476 to 489 of the 
transcript and John I<Jdison Spencer's Jjjxhibits 3, 4, 4a.) 
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As to certificate 84 for 125 shares, marked Indian-
ola Irrigation Company's Exhibit 20A, the evidence is 
that it was part of the water right mortgaged to {he Fed-
eral Building and Loan Association; that after the mort-
gage was foreclosed the Federal Building and Loan As-
sociation conveyed all of the water right it acquired to 
the Indianola Irrigation Company and received in re-
turn therefor a certificate of stock for 285 shares of 
which 223 acres or shares were the waters owned by 
R. H. Spencer and the balance of 62 or 62% acres or 
shares were owned by his children who signed the mort-
gage to the Federal Building and Loan Association. The 
certificate for 125 of the 285 shares was made out and 
delivered to R. H. Spencer. It will be noted that R. H. 
Spencer received something like 62 or 63 shares more 
when he purcha:sed the Iand and water back from the 
Federal Building and Loan Association than he had 
when ho made tl1e mortgage to the Federal Building 
and Loan Association. There i:s evidence that the Rugen-
tobler water was in that certificate. Mr. Pederson, a wit-
ness called by tho administrator of the estate of R. H. 
Spencer testified that the Hugentobler water came out 
of the water claimed by the Federal Building and Loan 
Association and not out of certificates 72 or 7B. ( Tr. 241.) 
Mrs. Louise Spencer, the .vife of John l~dison Spen-
cer, testified that on May 30, 1946 when the deeds wore 
delivered to .John .BJdison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs 
that Mrs. Tibbs mentioned that the deeds did not men-
tion any water and that Daddy (R. H. Spencer) told 
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her that when the litigation was finished and the water 
was clear she would get water for her ground. That 
Mr. Spencer also mentioned that water would go with 
the other land. On cross examination she testified that 
he gave ~Jdison certificate 84 and told him that was to 
be his and have it transferred. (Tr. 852-854.) On crosss 
examination an attempt was made to impeach Mrs. Spen-
cer by caiiing her attention to her testimony given at 
the time an administrator was appointed. Such testi-
mony wiii be found on pages 856 to 864. At the former 
hearing Mrs. Spencer did not testify about the delivery 
of the water certificate but it wiii be, noted that the sub-
ject matter of inquiry on the former hearing was the 
deeds which Mr. Spencer delivered to .John Edison 
Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs, which deeds had been 
brought in a sealed envelope from the office of Mr. Beal 
at Manti. 
John Edison Spencer testified that the certificate 
for 125 shares was given to him along with the deed to 
a tract of land (deed which is known as the Waupitz 
land). That he went and ta:1ked to the secretary of the 
Indianola Irrigation Company and he said he couldn't 
transfer it to me, that thereafter he took it to the Fed-
eral Building and Loan Association to see if there was 
an assignment from his father to him. (Tr. 626.) It 
should be noted that the foregoing testimony of John 
Edison Spencer was ob~ected to because the witness was 
incompetent to testify. The objection was overruled be-
cause the administrator had waived the objection by in-
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quiring into what the witness had testified to on a prior 
hearing. (See Tr. 466 and 467 and administrator's Ex-
hibit 14.) 
As to certificate numbered 72 the evidence shows 
that it came out of certificate 57. (See photostatic copy 
marked Indianola Irrigation Company's Exhibit 9.) That 
certificate No. 72 is dated December 30, 1933 and made 
out to Richard H. Spencer, Pledgee Federal Land Bank 
of Berkeley. It was so made out because Richard H. 
Spencer intended to secure a loan from that Bank, but 
the loan failed. That certificate was assigned to I. M. 
Price, Richard H. Spencer having signed his name to 
the same with the words "as part of security named in 
mortgage.'' The evidence shows that I. M. Price at~ 
tempted to foreclose a mortgage on that certificate, to-
gether with certificate No. 72 and 160 acres of land. 
(See John Edison Spencer's, et al, Exhibit 9, the same 
being the official files of the district court of Utah 
County.) It will be noted that the land therein des-
cribed is in Sections 5 in Sanpete County and parts of 
sections 33 and 34 in Township 11 South of Range 4 
East of Salt Lake Meridian. iThe reporter has copied 
all of the files in the transcript at pages 514 to 566. 
There is also in evidence a certified copy of the mort-
gage which was sought to be foreclosed. It will be noted 
that the mortgage is dated February 27, 1932 and was 
acknowledged the same day. 
It will be observed that with the land in Sanpete 
County there is included 160 acres of water right. It 
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will also be observed that the sheriff attempted to sell 
the 160 acres of water used on Section 5, Township 12 
South of Range 4 East, Salt Lake Meridian. The at-
tempt was made by both the sheriff of Utah County and 
Sanpete County. In the certificate of the sheriff of 
Sanpete County dated February 4, 1937 certificates 72 
and 73 are specifically mentioned. (See John Edison 
Spencer's, et al, Exhibit 10.) ·So far as appears no 
sheriff's deed to the land or bill of sale to the water were 
ever executed by the sheriff. 
In light of what occurred at the trial we shall not 
devote any time to a discussion of the mortgage fore-
cloure proceedings. We direct the attention of the court 
to Administrator's Exhibits 12 and 16 . 
.BJarly in the trial counsel for ·whittaker and coun-
sel for the administrator and counsel for the Indianola 
Irrigation Company demanded that counsel who appear-
ed by the record to represent Mr. Price show their au-
tlwrity to do so. (See Tr. pages 10-58-59. Thereupon 
.John Edison Spencer was sworn and testified touching 
that matter. (See rrr. 59.) Mr. L. Leland Larson also tes-
tified about our authority to act for .Mr. Price. ( 'Jlr. s;3-
85.) It will be noted that the trial of the cause began on 
.June 2:l, 1947. '11 he evidence above referred to was given 
on June 23 and 24. Later in the trial administrator's ex-
hibit 12 was received in evidence. It will he noted that 
such exhibit is dated July 14, 1947. It will also he noted 
that administrator's exhibit 16 characterized as a de-
position is dated the 1st day of March, 1947, several 
31 
months before the case came on for trial. No claim 
is made that counsel for Mr. Price, if he had one, 
or counse.l for .John IDdison Spencer or Elizabeth A. 
'l'ibhs ever had any notice that a deposition was to 
be taken. lt necessarily follows that to characterize 
the administrator's EJxhibit 16 a deposition is a 
a misnomer. However, the eon tents of that exhibit shows 
that Mr. Price disclaimed any right, title or interest in 
or to eertifi.cates 72 and 7:3. He states that he returned 
it to R. H. Spencer in 1934. "I paid $600 for it *** 
I do not claim any interest in it now. It was for a loan. 
I do not O\\Te anything to H. H. Spencer's estate. H does 
not owe me anything. T transferred the title to the water 
stock, Nos. 72 and 73 and beneh property and vVansit 
Farm back to H. H. Spencer in the fall of 1941." 
ln this connection with the deal between Price and 
R. H. Spem~er touching the two certificates 72 and 73 
IS the testimony of .John Henry Peterson. ('l'r. 446.) 
The court will have a difficult task to reconcile 
the foregoing statements of I. M. Price with the mort-
gage foreclmmre proceedings had in Utah County to 
which reference has heretofore been made. 
The position of counsel who thought they were rep-
resenting .Mr. Price was expressed by them at the trial. 
(See Tr. 497-4!)8, and 920 and 92f).) It will be noted that 
administrator's l£xhihit 16 was received in evidenee over 
the objection of counsel for .John l<Jdison Spencer and 
Mrs. Tibbs. (Tr. 918.) 
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We have not changed our mind in such particular. 
We shall not burden the court with an analysis of the 
transaction had between I. M. Price and R. H. Spencer 
touching certificates 72 and 73 because no matter what 
view is taken of the evidence the results will be the 
same, namely: that Price had a lien on the two certificates 
as security for a loan. That when the loan was paid off 
the certificates reverted to the persons who owned them 
before the loan was made. 
The evidence touching the ownership of certificate 
No. 72 independent of the question of whether or not 
the same is appurtenant to the land upon which it was 
used consist of the following: 
Louise Spencer testified that on May 30, 1946 when 
the deeds were delivered R. H. Spencer stated that: 
"when the litigation was finished and the water was 
clear she (Mrs. Tibbs) would get water for her ground. 
(Tr. 852.) Edison Spencer testified that according to 
an arrangement had with Price and his father he, Edison, 
was to pay to .the daughter of Price the sum of $1000,00 
and certificate numbered 72 was to be given to Mrs. 
Tibbs. (Tr. 608 and 640.) 
Counsel for the administrator cross examined John 
Edison Spencer at considerable length. (Tr. 738 to 749.) 
Apparently counsel for the administrator deemed it of 
considerable importance because Mr. Spencer at such 
former hearings testified that he claimed only 5 shares 
of water right. The fact was that at that time, as shown 
by the evidence, in this case, Mr. John Edison Spencer 
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did not, so far as he knew, have a record title on the 
books of the company to the water. in dispute. 
In the warranty deed dated May 31st, 1931 Richard 
H. Spencer and Annie Spencer, his wife, conveyed "40 
acres of land and 20 acres of water'' to Elizabeth A. 
Tibbs. (Tr. 35 and 36.) 
R. D. Tibbs, the husband of Elizabeth A. Tibbs, 
testified that he (R. H. Spencer) told Edison and Mrs. 
Tibbs that water went with the land that he conveyed to 
Mrs. Tibbs. (Tr. 824.) That on another occasion when 
the first deed was givn to :Mrs. Tibbs in 1943, he, R. H. 
Spencer, was to get water for the land conveyed to her 
as soon as the litigation was finished. (Tr. 828.) 
Independent of any question of appurtenancy the 
evidence bearing on the ownership of certificate No. 73 
shows: That certificate is made out to the Federal Land 
Bank of Berkeley as agent of the Land Bank Commis-
sioner, pledgee of John E. Spencer. On the back of the 
certificate it is assigned to I. M. Price by John E. Spen-
cer, as security for loan to R. H. Spencer as per mort-
gage. 
The warranty deed of Richard H. Spencer and An-
nie H. Spencer, his wife, to John E. Spencer conveys to 
John E. Spencer: The North One Half of the Southwest 
Quarter of Sec. 5, Township 12 South, Range 4 East, 
Salt Lake Meridian. 
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''Together with 80 acres of water in what is lmown 
as 'l'histle Creek". (See .John Eidson Spencer, et al, Ex-
hibit 12.) 
At the time of the death of R. H. Spencer and for 
t;ome time prior thereto certificates numbered 72 and .. 
78 were in the possession of the firm of attorneys, Lar-
son and Larson, until they were turned over to his pres-
ent counsel. (Tr. 615 and 670-671 and 717-718.) 
, We have directed the attention of the court to the 
evidence in this case at greater length and in more detail 
than usual in the statement of the case. vV e have done 
so because there are so many exhibits brought up with 
the record, a number of which were not received in evi-
dence, and the evidence presented in the transcript is 
so long that we have deemed it necessary to direct the 
attention of the court to where the evidence which we 
deem of importance may be found in the transcript. We 
hope that we have succeeded in directing the attention 
of the court to those portions of the evidence which are 
of controlling importance, if not doubtless opposing 
counsel will finish the undertaking. 
ASSIGNMEN'rS OF J1JRROR 
rrhe defandants and appellants John EJdison Spencer 
and Elizabeth A. Tibbs jointly and severally make the 
following assignments of error upon which they rely 
for a reversal of the judgment appealed from and for 
an order of this court directing the court below to make 
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findings of fact, conclusions of la:w and a judgment as 
prayed for by them in their pleadings: 
1. The trial court erred in making that part of its 
findings :wherein it is found that during the trial it :was 
made to appear that such appearance and pleadings (for 
Irwin M. Price) had not been authorized by him; for 
the reason that such findings is :without support in the 
evidence and is contrary to the clear preponderance 
thereof. (J. R. 249.) 
2. The trial court erred in holding that the trial 
was had on a disclaimer of John Edison Spencer because 
there was no disclaimer by John Edison Spencer to the 
water right involved in this controversy. (J. R. 250.) 
3. The trial court erred in that part of its finding 
numbered 7 wherein it found that Richard H. Spencer 
mortgaged to the Federal Building and Loan Associa-
tion, a corporation, 285 shares or acres of his said 448 
acres of primary or class "A" :water right, that such 
finding is without support in the evidence which affir-
matively shows that Richard H. Spencer mortgaged 
only 223 acres or shares of :water right to the Federal 
Building and Loan Association. (J. R. 256.) 
4. The trial court erred in making that part of its 
finding numbered 7 :wherein it found that he, Richard 
H. Spencer, mortgaged 60 shares or acres of his said 
448 acres of primary or class "A" :water right to M. H. 
Hadlock for the use and benefit of the creditors of the 
North Sanpete Bank. That such finding is :without sup-
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port in the evidence in that the mortgage is so ambigu-
ous and uncertain as to be nuH and void. (J. R. 256.) 
5. The trial court erred in making that part of 
its finding numbered 7 wherein it is found that on No-
vember 25, 1931 Richard H. Spencer conveyed to the 
Indianola Irrigation Company by. deed 160 shares or 
acres of his said 448 shares or acres of primary water 
right. That the evidence and the preponderance thereof 
shows that such conveyance was made on June 1st, 1918, 
and the evidence shows that such deed was and is so 
uncertain and ambiguous as to render it null and void. 
(J. R. 256.) 
6. The trial court erred in making that part of its 
finding numbered 7 wherein it found that: ''the said 
conveyance of 160 acres of water right made by said 
Richard H. Spencer to the Indianola Irrigation Com-
pany includes the 55 acres which he had previously mort-
gaged to Simon Hugentobler." That such finding is 
wholly without support in the evidence and is contrary 
to the evidence and the preponderance thereof. ( J. R. . 
256.) 
7. The trial court erred in making that part of its 
finding numbered 7 wherein it found in effect that the 
160 acres of water conveyed to the Indianola Irrigation 
Company included the 60 acres which, he, Richard 
H. Spencer, had previously mortgaged to W. H. Had-
lock. That such finding is without support in the evi-
dence and is contrary to the preponderance thereof. 
(J. R. 256.) 
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8. The trial court erred in making that part of its 
finding nUilnbered 8 wherein it is in effect found that 
Richard H. Spencer mortgaged to the FederarBuilding 
and Loan Association 285 acres of water. That such 
finding is without support in the evidence and is con-
trary thereto and the clear preponderance thereof. (J. R. 
256.) 
9. The trial court erred by in effect finding in its 
finding numbered ~) that in the case numbered 2888 civil 
a valid foreclosure proceeding was had and a valid sher-
iff's deed was given conveying 60 acres or shares of 
water to Rulon ~'. Starly, State Bank Commissioner of 
the State of Utah. That such findings are without sup-
port in the evidence and on the contrary the evidence 
shows that such proceedings were so ambiguous and 
uncertain as to render the same null and void. ( J. R. 
257.) 
10. The trial court erred in making that part of 
its finding numbered 10 wherein it found that on May 22, 
1939 Ru:lon F. Starly, State Bank Commissioner of the 
State of Utah was the owner, for the use and benefit of 
the creditors of North Sanpete Bank, of the right to the 
use of said 60 acres of primary water right or 60 shares 
of class "A" water right. That such finding is without 
support in the evidence and is contrary thereto in that 
the pretended mortgage sought to be foreclosed, the 
notice of the pretended sale and the pretended sheriff's 
deed are so uncertain and ambiguous as to render such 
documents and proceedings null and void. (J. R. 258.) 
:I 
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11. The trial court erred m making that part of 
its finding numbered 10 wherein it found that the Bank 
Commissioner of Utah conveyed to this plaintiff 60 acres 
of primary water right or 60 shares of class "A" water 
right, the same being a part of the 448 shares of primary 
or class "A" water so decreed to said Richard H. Spen-
cer, in case No. 1406. That such findings is without sup-
port in the evidence and is contrary thereto in that the 
pretended conveyance is so uncertain and ambiguous as 
to render the same null and void and no title passed to 
the plaintiff thereby. (J.R258) 
12. 'l'he trial court erred in making that part of its 
finding numbered 10 wherein it found that the plaintiff 
became and he has ever since been and now is the owner 
in fee simple of the right to the use of 60 acres of primary 
water right or 60 shares of class "A" water right of the 
waters of Thistle Creek and its tributaries for the irri-
gation of 60 acres of land in Section 3, Township 12 
South, Range 4 FJast, Salt Lake Meridian, in Sanpete 
County, State of Utah; that said 60 acres so owned by 
this plaintiff are a part of the 1728 acres of primary or 
class "A" rights mentioned and described in the decree 
in case No. 1406 aforesaid and a part of the 448 acres of 
primary water right or shares of class "A" rights de-
creed to said Richard H. Spencer in case No. 1406. That 
such finding is without support in the findings but is con-
trary thereto for the reason that the conveyance under 
which plaintiff claims title is so vague, uncertain and am-
biguous as to be null and void. ( .J.R. 259.) 
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13. rrhe court erred in making its finding numbered 
11 and the whole thereof and particularily to that part of 
finding numbered 11 wherein it is found that Richard H. 
Spencer conveyed 285 acres of water to the .F'ederal 
Building and Loan Association and that portion of said 
finding that there are 115 shares of class ''A'' stock of 
said corporation outstanding for which said corporation 
has no water stock. (J.R. 259) 
14. rrhe trial court erred in making that part of its 
finding numbered 15 wherein it found that plaintiff, 
.James C. vVhittaker, now is and ever since the 22nd day 
of :May, l!X3~) has been the owner, and entitled to the use 
and enjoyment and ever since the !Jth day of December, 
1~)37 ... he and his predecessors have been the owners and 
entitled to the use and enjoyment of 60 acres or shares 
of primal")' or class "A" water right in the waters of 
rrhistle Creek and its tributaries, the same being a part 
of the 448 acre:-; or shares of primary or Class" A" water 
right so decreed to Richard H. Spencer by the decree 
made and entered on May 6, 1920 in case No. 1406. rrhat 
such part of finding numbered 16 is without support in 
the evidence and is contrary to the preponderance there-
of. 'l1 hat the evidence and the preponderance thereof 
fails to show that Whittaker has title to such water right. 
(.T.R. 260) 
15. The court erred in finding in its finding num-
bered 17 that the plaintiff's title to 60 shares or acres 
of water right included and that its va1lue has been im-
paired or lessened for the reason that plaintiff has no 
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title to the water right claimed by him. rrhat such part 
of finding numbered 17 is without support in the evidence 
and is contrary to the preponderance thereof. (J.R. 260~) 
16. The trial court erred in making those parts of 
its finding numbered 17 wherein it in effect found that 
all of the claims of the defendants, except that of Que 
.Jensen and the State of Utah, are subsequent and sub-
ordinate to the right and title of the plaintiff therein 
and are void, and that none of the defendants to this 
action has any right, title or interest in or to the said 60 
acres of primary or class'' A'' water rights or part there-
of. That :mch findings are without support in the evi-
dence and the same are contrary to the evidence and the 
preponderance thereof. ( J .R. 261) 
17. The trial court erred in making its finding 
numbered 18 because such finding is without support in 
the evidence and the same is contrary to the evidence 
and the preponderance thereof. (J.R. 262) 
18. The trial court erred in making that part of find-
ing numbered 19 wherein it found that the 5;) shares of 
water right mortgaged to Simon Hugentobler and the 
60 shares of water right mortgaged to the 8tate Bank 
Commissioner-are part of the water right represented 
by said certificates numbered 72 and 73 aforesaid and 
particularly did the court err in making such finding as 
it might affect the rights of the plaintiff and Simon Hu-
gentobler because such finding is without any issue raised 
by Simon Hugentobler and/or the plaintiff as neither of 
41 
them made any such claim in the proceeding had to fore-
close their respective mortgages. r:l1hat such finding is 
without support in the evidence in this case and is con-
trary to the same and the preponderance thereof, and 
such finding is not within any issue raised by said plain-
tiff or by the successor in interest of Simon Hugentobler 
in the present action, and is at variance with the plead-
ings of each of the above mentioned parties to this action. 
( .T.R. 261 and 262.) 
1H. The trial court erred in making that part of its 
l'inding numbered 20 which in effect found that the claim 
of Irwin 11. Price to a lien on certificates numbered 72 
and 73 was subsequent to the decree of foreclosure en-
tered in case numbered 2888 civil for the reason that the 
claim of Irwin M. Price originated on February 27, 1932 
(See exhibit 1i3 of John gdison Spencer, et al) and as 
found by this court in its finding numbered 9 was entered 
on December 4, 1936. rrhat such finding is without sup-
port in the evidence and the same is contrary to the evi-
dence and the preponderance thereof. ( J.R. 262) 
20. That the trial court erred in making that part 
of its finding numbered 20 wherein it found that said 
certificates numbered 72 and 73 were returned to the 
possession of Richard H. Spencer for the reason that 
such finding is without support in the evidence and is 
contrary thereto and to the preponderance thereof. (J.R. 
262) 
21. The trial court erred in making that part of its 
finding numbered 20 wherein it found that at the time of 
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his death Richard H. Spencer was the owner and in pos-
session of said certificates and each of them and that 
Richard Leo Spencer, as administrator of the estate of 
Richard H. Spencer, deceased, is now entitled to 45 
shares of the class "A" stock of the Indianola Irrigation 
Company represented by certificates 72 and 73 after said 
certificates shall have been surrendered to the Indianola 
Irrigation Company and cancelled ami a new certificate 
for 45 shares of said class "A" stock shall be issued in 
lieu thereof. 'fhat such finding is without support in the 
evidence and is contrary to the evidence and the prepon-
derance thereof. (J.R. 262) 
22. 'l'he trial court erred in making that part of its 
finding numbered 20 wherein it found: "that the water 
right represented by certificate No. 72 is not appurtenant 
to the South Half of the Northwest Quarter of Section 5, 
Township 12 South, Hange 4 mast, Salt Lake Base and 
:Meridian in Sanpete County, Utah, claimed to be owned 
by Elizabeth A. Tibbs. That such finding is without sup~ 
port in the evidence and is contrary to the evidence and 
the preponderance thereof. (.J.R. 262) 
2i:3. The trial court erred in making that part of 
finding numbered 21 wherein it found that prior to the 
death of Richard H. Spencer he did not cause to be con-
veyed and transferred to John Edison Spencer the water 
right represented by certificates numbered 73 and num-
berecl84 in the Indianola Irrigation Company. rl'lwt such 
finding is without support in the evidence and the same 
43 
is contrary to the evidence and the preponderance there-
of. ( J.R. 262) 
24. The trial court erred in making its finding num-
bered 22 and the whole thereof. That such finding is with-
out support in the evidence and is contrary to the evi-
dence and the preponderance thereof. (.J.R. 263) 
25. The trial court erred in making its finding 
numbered 23 and the whole thereof. That such finding is 
without support in the evidence and the preponderance 
thereof. (J.R. 263-4) 
26. The trial court erred in making its finding 
numbered 24 and the whole and each part thereof. That 
such finding is without support in the evidence and is 
contrary thereto and the preponderance thereof. (J.R. 
264) 
27. The trial court erred in making its finding 
numbered 25 and the whole thereof. That such finding is 
without support in the evidence and is contrary thereto 
and the preponderance thereof. (J.R. 264) 
28. 'l'he trial court erred in making that part of its 
finding numbered 26 wherein it found that the deed 
which was made and executed by Richard H. Spencer 
and his wife as grantors to the Indianola Irrigation 
Company as grantee * * * is not null or void and is of 
full force and effect, that said deed * * * was actually 
signed and executed by Richard H. Spencer and his wife 
on November 25, 1931, and was never acknowledged by 
Richard H. Spencer or his wife. That the above quoted 
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parts of finding numbered 26 are without support in the 
evidence and the same are contrary thereto and the clear 
preponderance thereof. 
29. The trial court erred in making its finding 
numbered 27 and the whole and each part thereof. That 
such finding is without support in the evidence and is 
contrary thereto and the preponderance thereof. (J.R. 
265.) 
30. 'l'he tria11 court erred in its construction of 
what was alleged and what was found and what was 
adjudged in case numbered 2888 civil. That the court in 
said case numbered 2888 made its findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and decree as recited in such findings, 
conclusions and decree and not otherwise. 
31. The trial court erred in its finding numbered 
28 wherein it found that the trial court in 2888 civil 
found that the water rights involved in this action were 
subsequent and that the rights claimed by John Edison 
Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs were inferior to the 
rights of the plaintiff, that such rights were sold at pub-
lic auction to the plaintiff. That such findings are with-
out support in the evidence and are contrary thereto and 
the preponderance thereof. ( J .R. 266.) 
32. The trial court erred in that part of its finding 
numbered 28 wherein it found that the water rights 
involved in this action were sold and conveyed to the 
plaintiff herein and that the plaintiff herein has been 
and now is the owner of such water rights. That such 
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finding is without support in the evidence and is contrary 
thereto and the preponderance thereof. (J.R. 266) 
i33. The trial court erred in its finding numbered 
28 wherein it is found that Richard H. Spencer has filed 
his verified disclaimer in and to the water rights in-
volved in this action. The trial court likewise erred in its 
finding numbered 28 wherein it found that John Edison 
Spencer has filed his disclaimer to any of the water 
rights involved in this action. That such finding is with-
out support in the evidence and is contrary thereto and 
the preponderance thereof. More particularly the water 
rights which were disclaimed by Richard H. Spencer and 
John Edison Spencer and described in plaintiff's com-
plaint and particularly paragraph XIV thereof were 
"the right to the use of 60 acres of primary rights or 60 
shares of class ''A'' water rights of the waters of Thistle 
Creek and its tributaries for the irrigation of 60 acres of 
land in Section 3, Township 12 South, Range 4 East, Salt 
Lake Meridian, in Sanpete County. That the water rights 
here involved were never used on any land in Section 3 
above described. (See record 8) (.J.R. 266) 
i34. The trial court erred in making that part of 
its finding numbered 28 wherein it found that the dis-
claimer of Richard H. Spencer has never been withdrawn, 
modified or questioned in this action and is still binding 
upon him and all persons, including John Edison Spen-
cer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs, and likewise erred in finding 
tba t the alleged disclaimer of John Edison Spencer has 
never been withdrawn, dismissed, set aside, modified, 
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annuled or repudiated by him and is still binding upon 
him. That such findings and each of them is without 
support in the evidence and is contrary thereto and the 
preponderance thereof. And more particularly the trial 
court permitted both the administrator of the estate of 
Richard H. Spencer and John Edison Spencer to file an 
answer to the merits of plaintiff's complaint and the 
case was tried on the issues raised by plaintiff's com-
plaint and the answers thereto of the administrator of 
the estate of Richard H. Spencer and John Edison Spen-
cer. That plaintiff's counsel <lid not object to the trial on 
the merits; that by such proceedings the alleged dis-
claimer was in legal effect vacated and set aside. (J.R. 
266) 
i35. 'l'he trial court erred in making that part of its 
finding numbered 20 wherein it is found that the decree 
in No. 2888 civil has been and now is a valid, subsisting 
and fmal ;judg1nent and decree of said _court with respect 
to the water rights therein described and which are the 
same water rights claimed by the plaintiff in this action, 
and with respect to the water rights claimed by the plain-
tiff in this action, and with respect to the validity of the 
mortgage of the plaintiff in said action and with respect 
to the validity of the mortgage lien described in said 
action. rrlmt such finding is without support in the evi-
dence and is contrary thereto and the preponderance 
thereof. (J.R. 267) 
:16. The trial court erred in making subsection "b'' 
of its finding numbered 28 and each part and the whole 
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thereof. That such finding is without support in the 
evidence and is contrary thereto and the preponderance 
thereof. ( J.R. 267) 
:37. The trial court erred in making subsection "c" 
of its finding numbered 28 and each part thereof. That 
such finding is without support in the evidence and is 
contrary thereto and the preponderance thereof. (.T.R. 
267) 
38. 'l'he trial court erred in making its 1st conclu-
sion of law and each part thereof. That such conclusion 
of law is without support in the findings of fact and is 
likewise without support in the evidence. (J.R. 268) 
i39. 'l'he trial court erred in making that part of its 
conclusion of law wherein it concluded that Que Jensen 
is entitled to fifi/1728ths of the flow of said stream. 'l'hat 
such conclusion is without support in the evidence and is 
likewise vvithout support in the findings of fact. 
40. 'rhe trial comt erred in making its conclusion of 
law munlwre<l 3 and each part thereof. That such conclu-
sion of law is without support in the evidence and is like-
wise without support in the finding-s of fact. ( J.R. 267) 
41. The trial court erred in making its conclusion 
of law numbered 5 and each part thereof. That such 
conclusion of law is without support in the evidence 
and likewise is without support in the findings of fact. 
(J.H. 270) 
42. The trial court erred in making its conclusion 
of law numbered 6 and the whole thereof. That such 
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is likewise without support in the findings of fact.(J.R. 
271) 
4:1. The trial court erred in making its judgment 
and decree contained in paragraph 1 and each part 
thereof in so far as said judgment affects the defendants 
and appellants John F.Jdison Spencer and Elizabeth A. 
rribbs, or either of them. That such judgment and decree 
is without support in the evidence and is likewise without 
support in the findings of fact and is against law. (J.R. 
274) 
44. The trial court erred in making that part of its 
jud.t,'1.nent contained in paragraph 2 thereof wherein it 
adjudged that Que .Jensen is awarded 55/1728th of the 
flow of said stream. That such judgment or decree is 
without support in the evidence and is likewise without 
support in the findings of fact. (J.R. 274) 
45. The trial court erred in making paragraph 3 of 
its judgment in so far as the same affects the defendants 
and appellants ,John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. 
Tibbs, or either of them. That said paragraph 3 of the 
judgment or decree in so far as the same affects the 
defendants and appellants John Edison Spencer and 
!1Jlizabeth A. Tibbs is without support in the evidence 
and is likewise without support in the findings of fact 
and is against law. (J.R. 274) 
46. The trial court erred m making its judgment 
or decree contained in paragraph 5 thereof. That the 
judt,rment therein contained is without support in the 
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evidence and is likewise without support in the findings 
of fact and is contrary to law. (J.R. 275) 
4-7. rrhe trial court erred in making its conclusions 
of law numbered 6 and the whole thereof. That the 
judt:,r:rnent contained in said paragraph 6 is without sup-
port in the evidence and ilikewise without support in the 
findings of fact and the same is contrary to law. (J.R. 
267) 
48. The trial court erred in not making findings of 
fact, conclusions of law. and decree awarding to .John 
J1~dison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs the rights to the 
use of the waters of Thistle Creek and its tributaries 
as prayed for in their counterclaim and cross complaint. 
Ml. The trial court erred in denying the motion of 
Richard H. Spencer and John Edison Spencer to strike 
each and all of the allegations sought to be stricken by 
their motion filed in this cause on April 22, 1942. ( J.R. 
41 to 44) 
· 50. The trial court erred in overruling the demur-
rer of Richard H. Spencer and John Edison Spencer filed 
in the above entitled cause on June 00, 1943. (.J.R. 48-49.) 
ARGUMENT 
vVe have heretofore in our statement of the case 
directed the attention of the court to the testimony of 
.John Edison Spencer and L. Leland Larson, who at the 
trial was one of coqnsel for John Edison Spencer and 
Elizabeth A. 'l'ibbs hut who is no longer of counsel for 
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them because he was subsequent to the trial of the cause 
appointed to the District Court of the Seventh .Judicial 
District of Utah. 
It will be seen from such testimony that opposmg 
eonnse1 requested that counsel who claimed to be repre-
senting Irwin M. Price s}ww their authority so to do. 
Thereupon .John Edison Spencer was called and testified 
that he was authorized by Irwin M. Price to secure coun-
sel to represent him. That he had a letter wherein he was 
granted such authority. He said the letter was at his 
home and that he would produce the letter the following 
day. He was unable to find the letter. (Tr. 59 to 62 and 
81-82) '11hereupon L. Leland Larson was called and after 
being sworn testified that he is an attorney at law and 
has been engaged in the practice of law since 192~); that 
he has known Irwin 1\f. Price since about 1940; that the 
firm of which he was a member represented Mr. Price for 
the period up to the time his firm had withdrawn; that he 
had been reemployed in connection with me; that he had 
ealled l\f r. Price at San Francisco by telephone and told 
him that there was a dispute about whether he was being 
represented by you and by me in this ease and asked him 
if he had authorized Edison Spencer to employ you in 
this case, and he said he had, and I told him that I had 
been associated in the case by you and Edison had asked 
me to come in the case, and he said that it was alright. I 
asked him if he would ratify everything we had done in 
eonneetion with the matter up until the present time and 
he said he did and if there was any question about it go 
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ahead and fight it until we were satisfied the matter was 
cleared up one way or another. (Tr. 84-85) 
In the light of testimony it is easy to understand 
why .1\Ir. Larson would make the statement he did make 
as set out on pages 926 and 927 of the transcript. There 
is no competent evidence to the contrary. There was 
admitted in evidence administrator's Exhibits 12 and 16. 
I think no lawyer will seriously contend that such ex-
hibits are competent evidence, except to show that I. M. 
Price no longer claimed the water right in question. 
When counsel for John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. 
'ribbs objected to the introduction of Exhibit 16, counsel 
represented that he offered such exhibit for the purpose 
of rebutting the evidence theretofore offered tending to 
show that Irwin M. Price owned certificates 72 and 73. 
('rr. 917 to 921) 
Notwithstanding the evidence above quoted and re-
ferred to the trial court in its preliminary findings found 
that: "Appearances had been made and various plead-
ings filed for and on behalf of Irwin 11. Price but during 
the trial it was made to appear that such appearances and 
pleadings had not been authorized by him." ( J.R. 249) 
If such a finding upon such evidence is to be justified 
then indeed is the practice of law a precarious profes-
sion. If such a finding on such a record is to be sustained 
every lawyer may be subject to disbarment because he 
has pretended to represent a client when he knows that 
he has no such authority or because he knowingly and 
falsely testified that he had, on the night before giving 
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such testimony, received the express authority to con-
tinue to represent his client. All of these results can be 
accomplished by opposing counsel or their clients, with-
out any notice or knowledge to accused counsel of what 
is to be attempted, securing an affidavit from the client 
of accused counsel that such counsel has no authority to 
represent his client. We submit that such is not the law, 
never has been the law and we hope never will be the 
law, not even in this case, except in the mind of the trial 
court and those who may have induced it to sign the 
findings in this case. 
We are still somewhat at a loss to know just what 
our duties are towards Irwin M. Price. It would certainly 
ill become us to argue that he never acquired any rights 
under the mortgage foreclosure proceeding which he 
prosecuted to judgment. Nor can we well argue that he 
presently has an interest in the water rights involved in 
this action because, if we did that, we would be confront-
ed with the document marked Inxhibit 16 which, while im-
properly ealled a deposition, does have the effect of dis-
claiming any interest in the water right here involved or 
the land upon which it has at all times been used. Under 
such circumstances the writer of this brief has concluded 
to take Mr. Price at his word, namely: that he secured the 
water certificates 72 and 73 as security for a loan made 
to Richard H. Spencer who has paid the loan and the 
certificates have been returned to Richard H. Spencer 
and the whole transaction cancelled. 
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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING TO 
PLAIN rt' 1 F F' 60/1728ths AND TO QUE JFJNSI<JN 
55/1728ths Ol<' THE~ FLOW OF THlSTLl~ CR~l<JK 
AND ITS 'I'RIBU'r ARUJS. 
'rhe articles of incorporation of the Indianola Irri-
gation Company, (Indianola Irrigation Company's J<Jx-
hibit 7) among other things, provides: 
''Article 5. 
"The capitol stock of this corporation shall 
be $80,000 Eighty Thousand Dollars divided into 
Twenty Two Hundred shares as follows: Eigh-
teen Hundred shares of class ''A'' stock of the 
par value of Forty Dollars per share and Four 
Hundred shares of Class "B" stock of the par 
value of Twenty Dollars per share." 
Article 19 provides in substance that from March 
15th to June 15th class ''A'' and class '' B'' stockhoilders 
shall be entitled to an equal amount of water per share. 
After June 15th to the following March lst of the follow-
ing year each share of class "A" stock shall entitle the 
holder to 1/40 of a second foot, and if there is any water 
left over after supplying the cllass "A" stockholders 
during the period extending from .June 1.5th to March 1st 
of the following year the same shall be divided prorata 
to the stockholders of the class "B" stock. So far as ap-
pears the water right has been divided as provid~d in the 
articles of incorporation. ·Obviously if Que Jensen is 
awarded 55/1728 of the flow of Thistle Creek he will get 
more water than he is entitled to. There were at least 
1728 shares of class "A" stock and 490 shares of 0lass 
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"B" stock outstanding at the time of the trial. (Tr. 311) 
Obviously if Que Jensen gets 55/1728 of the water of 
Thistle Creek as decreed to him he will get not only 
water to supply his 55 shares of class "A" water right 
but also a portion of tl1e class "B" water right. He does 
not have and so far as the record shows never has had 
any class "B" stock. Thus if the a ward made to Que 
Jensen is affirmed the other stockholders, including 
John Edison Spencer, will be deprived of a part of their 
water rights. 
What we have said in i>upport of the attack made on 
the conclusion of 'law and decree in our assignments 
numbered 39 and 44 as to the water decreed to Que J en-
sen applied to the water right awarded to the plaintiff 
James C. Whittaker which we have attacked by our as-
signments numbered 38 and 43. 
It will be noted in the conclusions of law and decree 
so attacked the court concludes and decrees to plaintiff 
.James C. -Whittaker 60;/1728 of the waters of rrhistle 
Creek notwithstanding even if he is entitled to prevail 
in this action, contrary to our contention, as to 60 acres 
or ::.;hares of class "A" water right he is, even in such 
event, not entitled to the quantity of water awarded to 
him. There is no evidence that Whittaker ever owned or 
even claimed any class "B" water right yet by the decree 
he is awarded not only water stock which goes with 60 
acres or shares of class" A" water right but in addition 
thereto 60/1728 of the class "B" water rights of 'l'histle 
Creek and its tributaries. 
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THJ<J l\fORTOAOJ<J, TI-ll<~ C011 PLAIN'r SEEKING TO 
FORECLOSJ<J THID MORTGAGJD, 'l'HI<J DECREJ<J OF 
FOHJ<JCLOSUHI<J, 'l'HJD SHJ<JRJFF''S DFJFJD '1'0 HAD-
LOCK, BANK COMl\1ISSIONFJH AND TIUJ DEED 
TO THJ<J Pl,AfN'rlFF~ THHOUGH \VfHCH PLAJN-
'l'IFF' CLAIMS 'l'l'l'Ll<J AIUJ SO VAGUI<J, AMBIG-
UOUS AND UNCJ<JR'l'AIN 'rHA'l' PLAIN'I'H-,I<' AC-
QUIRJ1JD NO 'rTTLJ<} 'l'O WA'L'ERS IN CON'L'RO-
V"J<JHSY BY RI<JASON TJUJREOF. 
Our assignments num he red :3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 1:1, 14, 
1i>, 17, 18, 24, 2fi, 2s, 2D, :3o, :n, :32, :l:l, :34, :35 
JG, :37 and il.S may well and will he grouped and disenssed 
under this heading in so far as they affect the claim made 
hy \Vhi ttaker to GO shares or acres of Class ''A'' water 
right in Thistle Creek and its tributaries. 
.. 
At the outset ,.,.e di!"eet the attention of the court to 
om statutor~· law and the authorities dealing with the 
deeree of certainty required in the description of pro-
perty which is eonveyed or mortgaged, in order to render 
such conveyance or mortgage valid. 
"While it is not entirely dear whether plaintiff seeks 
to recover the right to the use of the sixty shares or 
acres on the theory that the same is appurtenant to real 
estate and as snch subject to the law affecting real pro-
perty or on the theory that the water is personal proper-
ty. It would ;;;eem however in the final analysis plaintiff 
bottoms his claim upon the claim that the 60 shares or 
acres of water right is real estate and appurtenant to 
some land. In any event the degree of certainty is the 
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same whether it he real or personal property except 
where the pen;ona,J property is delivered to the mort-
gagee. ln this case neither the plaintiff nor the hank 
eonnnissioner under whom he claims title was ever in 
th.e possession of any water certificate nor have they or 
either of tl1em ever heen in possession or l!ad the us~ of 
tl1e water which is claimed by the plaintiff. 
It is said in i~(j Am .. Jur., ~:<cdions 42, 4:~ and 47, page 
711 and 712 that: 
~ection 42. wwhile there is authority to 
the effed that the courts more dosely scrutinize, 
and require a higher degree of crtainty in, the 
description of property in a mortgage than in an 
absolute eonveyance. generally the rules as to 
descriptions of real estate in mortgages conform 
to tho:,;e with respect to description:,; in deed:,;. 
ln this connection it has been held that Inistakes 
in the matter of deseription do not vitiate the 
:,;ecurity any more than they would a conveyance 
of the land, provided they are capable of correc-
tion, and that a mortgage wil;J not he invalidated 
by reason of an error in the de:,;cription of the 
property, in ca:,;e the remainder of the de8cription, 
after rejecting the erroneous portion, is suffi-
ciently definite to enable the land to b(~ located. 
1 n regard to an ambiguity in a mortgage, tht-
modern tendency is to allow a liberal interpreta-
tion of the description of the property and to up-
hold the validity of the mortgage if in any way 
it is possible to arrive at the intention of the 
parties thereto. Mortgages are also frequently 
upheld against attacks based upon the indefinite-
ness of the mortgage. In this respect, any refer-
ence or description by which the premises in-
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tended to be dealt with may be found and identi-
fied it> generally regarded as sufficient, and a 
description wiill not be deemed insufficient if, by 
any reat>onable construction of its terms, it can 
be held to inclose or embrace a particular tract 
of land. Furthermore, a description may be suf-
ficient even though it may be necest>ary ·on ac-
count of its imperfect or indefinite character to 
ai(l the intention of the parties by averring and 
proving extrinsic facts. Accordingly, in order 
to identify the property intended to be mort-
gage(l, and to give affect to the intention of the 
TJarties to the instrument, parol evidence is gen-
erally held admissible to explain a mistake i11 
<lescription of property in a mortgage, or to ex. 
plain and remove an uncertainty. However, if 
tlw (leseription of the land is so vag·ue and in-
definite that effect could not be given the instru-
ment without writing iww materia,] language into 
it, parol Pvidence is not admissible. A mortgage 
must contain such a certain and definite descrip-
tion of the property encumbered as to make it the 
subject of the charge created.'' 
Reetion 4:1. "rrhe old classification of am-
biguities into "latent" and "patent" is still ap-
pliecl by many courts to descriptions of property 
in mortgages of real estate. The general rule 
nn(ler this distinction is that a patent ambiguity 
in a mortgage -may not he removed by. parol evi-
dence. Within the meaning of this rule, a patent 
ambiguity is such an uncertainty appearing on the 
face of the instrument that the court, reading the 
language in the light. of all the facts and cir-
cumstances referred to in the instrument, is un-
able to derive therefrom the intention of the 
parties, as to what l)and was to be conveyed. The 
reason for the r.ule is that otherwise new Ian-
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guage would be inserted into the instrument. In 
any event, it is clear that a latent ambiguity in 
a mortgage may be explained and removed by 
parol evidence. Within the meaning of this rule, 
a latent ambiguity is an uncertainty which does 
not appear on the face of the instrument, but is 
shown to exist for the first time by matter out-
side the writing, when an attempt is made to 
apply tho writing to the property. The reason for 
the rule is that the ambiguity having been re-
vealed hy matter outside the instrument, it may 
he removed in the same manner. A typical in-
stance of a latent ambiguity in a mortgage is a 
case where the description applies equally to 
each of two things. There is a so-called inter-
rne<liate type of ambiguity which partakes of the 
nature of both a latent and patent ambiguity, to 
explain which parol evidenee is generalJy held to 
he admissible.'' 
Section 47. '"l'he general rule is that parol 
evidence is admissible where land is described 
in a mortgage as a'' part'', ''half'', or'' fraction'', 
with a further desm·iption sufficient to serve as 
a guide to the location of the land intended to be 
eonveyed. This rule also prevai'ls where the mort-
gage refers to a certain number of acres out of a 
particular tract of land. vVhere, however, the in-
strument does not contain a description sufficient 
to point out tho way for the identification of the 
land, parol evidence is not admissible, because the 
mortgage must set forth a subject matter, either 
eertain within itself or capable of being made 
certain by extrinsic matter to which tho instru-
ment refers.'' 
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For other general discussions of the certainty re-
quired in a deed or real estate mortgage see 12 L.R.A. 
177; 41 C. J. 399 and cases there cited. 
1t has been stated generally that where the descrip-
tion is such that the sheriff could readily ascertain the 
parcel to be sold by him and the surveyors locate it the 
description is sufficient, otherwise not. ~ee 137 Am. St. 
Rep. 2:>3. Such is the purpose of the statutory law of 
Utah. U.C.A. 1943, 104-1:3-4 provides: 
"In an action for the recovery of real estate 
it must be described in the complaint with such 
certainty as to enable an officer upon execution 
to identify it." 
The following holdings of cases will show the trend 
of judicial authority: 
R1f;nch rs. Crowe (Ark.) 203 S.W. 584 wherein a 
mortgage on real estate contained the following descrip-
tion: 
"Residue of the West Half of the Southwest 
Quarter of Section 4, Township 2 North, Range 
2 J;Jast, containing 78 acres.'' 
lt is held that the description is too vague and indef-inite 
to constitute a valid mortgage and the same was void. 
In the case of Harris vs. Wooda.nl (N. C.) 41 S.E. 
790 the mortgage contained this description: 
''Certain tract of land including Grist mill 
and fixtures and one store house, including 3 
acres.'' 
I ' 
' f 
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']Jte whole tract consisting of 40 acres was described in 
the mortgage. It was held that every deed of conveyance 
must set forth a subject matter either certain in itself or 
capable of being reduced to a certainty by recurrence 
to something extrinsic to which the deed refers. 
In the case of Cathey vs. Lumber Co. (N.C.) 66 S.E. 
fl80' the deed conveyed '' 324 acres of land of a certain 
tract composed of Lots 44, 97, 98 in Graham County." 
'Phe entire tract within the lots described consisted of 
724 acres. It was held that the deed furnished no means 
by whielt the 324 acres could be identified and set apart 
nor did it refer to something extrinsic to it by which the 
acres sought to be conveyed could be located. It is held 
that it is self evident that a certain part of a whole can-
not he set apart unless the part can be in some way iden-
tified. Therefore where a grantor undertakes to con-
vey a part of a tract of land his conveyance must itself 
furnish the means by which the part can be located; 
otherwise the deed is void, for i,t is e:lementary that every 
deed of conveyance must set forth a subject matter, 
either certain within itself or capable of being made 
certain by recurrence to something extrinsic to which 
the deed refers. 
In the case of Wilson vs. Oalhoun (Tenn.) 11 S. W. 
( 2d) 908 it is said: 
"The degree of certainty with which the 
premises must be denoted is defined in many 
books and the cases are extremely numerous in 
which the subject has been illustrated. They are 
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not all harmonious. But they agree in this, that 
it is essential that the description have such par-
ticulars and tokens of identification as to render 
a resort to extrinsic aid entirely needless when 
the writing comes to be applied to the subject 
matter. The terms may be abstract and of a gen-
eral nature hut they must be sufficient to fit and 
comprehend the property which is the 1mbject of 
the transaction, so that with the assistance of 
external evidence the description, without being 
contradicted or added to can be connected with 
and applied to the very property intended and 
to the exclusion of all other property.'' 
An instructive case is that of M a.r,well vs. JYfaxwell, 
(Wash.) 123 Pac. (2d) 335 where a number of other 
eases are cited. It will be observed from that ease that 
when a conveyance is vague and ambiguous there must 
be dear and convincing proof of the intention of the 
grantor before a court of equity will reform the deed. 
In this case apparently no attempt was made to reform 
the mortgage in the course of the proceedings to fore-
close the same. 
The ease of Jacobsen vs. Chrristenson, 18 Utah 149, 
fi5 Pac. f'l62 involved the validity of a mortage on 700 
head of sheep. While that case deals with a chattel mort-
gage as heretofore indicated the requirements of real 
estate mortgages and mortgages on personal property 
as to the definiteness in descriptions is the same or sub-
stantially so. We quote the following from the syllabus 
which reflects the opinion of the court in that ease: 
''A mortgage of a specific number of sheep out 
of a herd comprising a much larger number of 
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similar sheep, which does not separate or desig-
nate the sheep mortgaged is void for uncer-
tainty." 
Applying the principles announced in the foregoing 
cases to the case in hand it will be seen that the Hadlock 
mortgage falls squarely within that class of mortgages 
which are held void for uncertainty. R H. Spencer at 
the time he executed the mortgage to Hadlock was the 
owner of 448 shares or acres of water right to Thistle 
Creek and its tributaries. True he had mortgaged some 
water right to the Federal Building and Loan Associa-
tion but he was none the less the owner thereof when 
the Hadlock mortgage was executed. There is abso-
lutely nothing in the Hadlock mortgage from which the 
court can conclude that the mortgage was a first mort-
gage. There is some very substantial evidence to the 
effect that the water right which was intended to be 
covered by the Hadlock mortgage was for water used 
on some Indian lands in Section 3, which lands were 
taken away from R. H. Spencer. H. M. Spencer, a son of 
R. H. Spencer, on cross examination by counsel for the 
plaintiff testified: 
''That at one time his father secured a deed 
from the Indians for that land: The deed was 
secured about 30 years ago. (Tr. :186-387.) That 
water was used on that land, which consisted of 
160.7 acres. No decree was ever entered for that 
water right." (Tr. 389-390.) 
ln plaintiff's complaint filed herein he apparently claims 
the water right to which he seeks to quiet title is water 
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used on Section 3, Township 12 South, Range 4 East, 
Salt Lake Meridian. (See the 'l,ast part of paragraph 
14. R. 8.) 
The evidence in this case shows without conflict that 
the water right here involved and represented by the 
certificates of shares was always used on Sections 5 
and 8. No part of it was ever used on Section 3. 
If we examine the mortgage given to the Bank 
Commissioner there is no language therein which even 
remotely sheds any light on what shares or acres of 
water right was mortgaged, except that it was "sixty 
shares or acres of water right owned by R. H. Spencer 
in the waters of Indianola Creek, Thistle Creek and Rock 
Creek in addition to the waters used for the irrigation 
of the above described land. The lands described in the 
mortgage was only a part of Section 3. (See Exhibit 
"G" attached to the amended complaint in case num-
bered 2888 which is marked: "John Edison Spencer, 
et al. Exhibit 14.) 
'l'here are two files in 2888, the one just referred to is 
File No. 1. 
The decree of foreclosure contains the same des-
cription of the sixty shares which were attempted to be 
foreclosed as does the mortgage. No more and no less. 
(See paragraph 1 of the decree of foreclosure in case 
2888.) Likewise the notice of sale contains identically 
the same description of the 60 acres or shares of water 
as is contained in the mortgage. So also the return of 
! r 
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the sheriff and the sheriff's deed contain identically the 
same description as does the mortgage. (See abstract 
plaintiff's Exhibit "W".) When the bank commissioner 
made the deed out to the plaintiff he placed therein 
~ome embelishing languaw~. (See 'rr. 97.) Of course 
we believe, no one not even counsel for the plaintiff, 
Whittaker, will claim that the recitals contained in such 
conveyance en'larged or corrected any infirmity that 
theretofore existed in the title to the bank commissioner. 
Moreover, in such conveyance the bank commissioner 
did not have the temerity to describe the water right con-
veyed, except to state that the same came out of the 448 
acres or shares of class "A" water right decreed to 
Richard H. Spencer. Now here in the entire chain of 
title is there a scintilla of evidence which meets the re-
quirements laid down by the authorities above cited, 
namely: that when the conveyance or mortgage does not 
contain a description sufficient to point out the way for 
the identification of the land, evidence is not admissible 
to determine the land intended because the mortgage 
or other conveyance must set forth a subject matter 
which is certain within itself or capable of being made 
certain by extrinsic matters to which the in~trmnent re-
fers. None of the instruments through which plaintiff 
claims title refer to any decree or any shares of capital 
stock or other matters to point out the particular water 
stock, except the deed from the bank commissioner to the 
plaintiff docs mention that the water conveyed came out 
of the 448 shares of stock once decreed to Richard H. 
Spencer. 
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In connection with the authorities above mentioned 
the attention of the court is directed to the provisions 
of U.C.A. 1943, 104-13-4. It is there provided: 
''In an action for the recovery of real pro-
perty it must be described in the complaint with 
suc.h certainty as to enable an officer, upon exe-
cution, to identify it." 
This court has construed the foregoing statute in 
Drake vs. 8rnith, 14 Utah 35, 45 Pac. 1006; Cente.r Creek 
lrrig. Co. L's. Lindsay, 21 Utah 1~}2, 60 Pac. 559; Pi.tchsos 
vs. Jones, et al 76 Ut. 6, 290 Pac. ~J58. 
U.C.A. 1943, 104-:-37-29 provides that upon the sale 
of real property the officer inust give to the purchaser 
a certificate of the sale containing: 
( l) A particular description of the real property 
sold. So also must a judgment be certain and specific. 
When and only when a judment is ambit,ruous may it be 
aided by the pleadings and other parts of t.he record 
and if the description obtainable from it and them would 
be sufficient if found in a conveyance to divest title 
of the grantor it will be sufficient to sustain sa1les made 
or possession taken under the judgment otherwise all 
proceedings under it must be treated as void." 
Freeman on .Judgnwnts, 5 Ed., Vol. 1, page 165, 166, 
Sec. ~)6: 
Jn support of the foregoing quotation of the eminent 
author there are collected a number of cases to which 
the court is referred if they should desire to examine 
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cases from other jurisdictions. We, however, will not 
burden the court with an analysis of cases from foreign 
jurisdictions, because, as we believe, the cases in this 
jurisdiction point the way to a proper determination 
of thjs phase of the case. 
The question of the degree of certainty required 
m a judgment or decree dealing with water rights has 
been before our Supreme Court in a number of cases, 
among them being: 
l<Jlliot vs. Whitmore, 8 Utah 254, 30 P. ~)84. 
Smith vs. Phillips, 6 Ut. i376, 2:1 Pac. 932. 
Nephi Irrigation Co. vs. Vickers, 15 Ut. 374, 49 Pac. 301. 
:Sharp vs. Whitmore, 51 Ut. 14, 168 Pac. 273. 
Other cases from neighboring states are: 
"\V alsh vs. Wa'llace, 26 Nev. 299; 67 Pac. 914, 918. 
Riverside \Vater Co. vs. Sargent, 112 Cal. 2:10; 44 Pae. 
560. 
Lillis vs. :E:mmigrant Ditch Co., 95 Cal. 553, 30 Pac. 1108. 
In the case of Sharp vs. Whitman it is said: 
''One of the essentials of a valid judgment 
is that the judgment be definite and certain re-
specting the relief granted. In judgments defining 
and determining conflicting claims, rights, and in-
terests in and to the use of water in this arid 
region is indispensable. The rule, the soundness 
of which is self evidence, is so well established 
that it would be a work of supererogation to cite 
authorities illustrating and supporting it.'' 
Whi'le the cases above cited deal with the matter of 
uncertainty in the quantity of water involved the prin-
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ciples of law there announced are equally applicable 
here. It would seem to be at least as vital to the validity 
of a decree to identify the water sought to be decreed 
as it is to fix the flUantity of the water affected by the 
decree. 
The necessity of the requirement that a judgment 
to be valid must be certain is well illustrated by the pro-
ceedings had in this case. After the so-called judgment 
was rendered the sheriff, armed with a writ of assistance 
attempted to find the water which it was c'laimed had 
been sold under foreclosure. He was unable to do so. 
An officer of the banking department with the assistance 
of the present counsel for the plaintiff undertook in 
vain to find the water which he claims was conveyed to 
him by the purchaser under the foreclosure proceedings. 
The secretary of the defendant company was at a loss 
to know what water right was sold pursuant to the fore-
closure proceedings. ( Tr. 86 and 199.) Finally in des-
peration this action is brought to quiet title to 60 acres 
or shares of water right which at one time it is claimed 
was included in the 448 shares or acres of water owned 
by Richard H. Spencer. 
As we have heretofore pointed out so far as appears 
from the description in the mortgage in the findings of 
fact, and in the judgment itself the sixty acres or shares 
now claimed by the plaintiff is equa'lly applicable to any 
sixty acres or shares of the 448 acres or shares once 
owned by Spencer. To say that such water right was con-
fined to a water right that was free and clear of encum-
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brance is to read into the mortgage language foreign 
thereto. So also to argue that the decree of foreclosure 
deseribed any particular sixty acres or shares of the 
water right formerly owned by R. H. Spencer is bottomed 
upon a false premise. It is of the very essence of a valid 
judgment that it must finally fix and determine the right 
of the parties on the issues submitted by specifically 
denying or granting the relief sought by the action. 
49 C .. J.S. page G et seq. Under the provision:-; of U.C.A. 
1943, 104-14-4 a court may within ninety days after a 
judt,'lJlent is rendered, upon proper showing, set aside 
or amend the same. In this case no application was 
made to amend the judgment within the time allowed 
by law or for that matter has such an application yet 
been made by any party to the jud.!-,'lnent. Notwithstand-
ing the plaintiff in this case was not a party to the fore-
closure proceeding he is in effect seeking to amend the 
foreclosure proceeding under the guise of a suit to quiet 
title. 
It is solely because of uncertainty and ambiguity of 
the decree of foreclosure and the sale had pursuant 
thereto that there is any controversy between the par-
ties to this proceeding as to what water right was mort-
gaged, or as to what water right was ordered fore-
closed and sold under the foreclosure proceedings. It 
may be that if, by proper pleading and proof, the plain-
tiff had alleged that Spencer intended to mortgage a 
specified 60 shares or acres of water right and the proofs 
had sustained such an averment the p'laintiff would 
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have heen entitled to a decree of foreclosure on the water 
right so alleged and shown. That, however, was not done. 
To permit the plaintiff, who was not even a party to the 
foreclosure proceding, at this late date to re-litigate 
what should have been litigated in the mortgage fore-
closure proceeding is without support in either statutory 
or common law and is contrary to the adjudicated cases. 
See 49 C.J.S., page 436, et seq., Section 229, 230, and 
eases cited in the foot notes. 
In this connection it may be noted that the validity 
and effect of a judgment must be determined from the 
lan§.,'Uage contained in the judgment itself, provided if 
a judgment is uncertain and ambiguous resort may be 
had to the findings of fact and conclusions of law. 30 
Am. Jur., 998, 81ec. 284 and cases cited in the foot note. 
In this connection it will be observed that in case 
numbered 2888 it was, among other matters, decreed: 
"that the defendants, Richard H. Spencer, Annie H. 
Spencer, John Edison Spencer, Robert 0. Tihbs and 
mli~abeth A. Tibbs be and are hereby restrained and 
enjoined from in any way assigning, transferring, dis-
posing of or encumbering certificates of stock num-
bered 72 and 73 issued by the Indianola Irrigation Com-
pany, or the water rights represented by said certifi-
cates, or any other water right held or claimed by said 
defendants in the waters of Thistle Creek, clear Creek 
or Rock Creek until the further order of this court.'' 
It will further be noted that neither in the original 
complaint or in his amended complaint did Hadlock 
·, ( 
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mention or seek to foreclose a mortgage on either certi-
ficate No. 72 or 7.3 or any other certificate or any speci-
fied shares or acres of water belonging to Richard H. 
Spencer. Hadlock was content in his mortgage fore-
closure proceeding to rely on the vague, uncertain 
description contained in his mortgage which as we 
heretofore pointed out was void hecam;e of its uncer-
tainty. 
If the court that tried case No. 2888 had intended 
that the Hadlock mortgage should have been forclosed 
as to certificates 72 and 73 it would have so ordered. The 
fact that it did not so order conclusively shows that the 
court did not so intend. Nor could the court bind the 
parties if it had so intended because to have so intended 
would have been without support in the findings and 
conclusions. 
It is an elementary principle of law that a judgment 
is valid only to the extent that the same is supported by 
the pleadings. The 'law in such particular is thus expres-
sed by our own Supreme Court in the case of Cooke vs. 
Cooke, 67 Utah 271, 248 P,ac. 83, at page 104 of the 
Pacific reports: 
'' gvery court must acquire jurisdiction from 
its record which every court must have and keep 
and which binds the court; and there is no prin-
ciple better established than what is not juri-
dically presented cannot be jurisdically decided. 
Just as elemental is it that pleadings are the 
juridical means of investing a court with juris-
diction of the subject matter to adjudicate it and 
71 
that a jud~:,"''nent or decree beyond or not within 
them is a nullity, for the court is bound by its 
record. These are immutable elements." 
In the case of Stockyards Nat. Barnk vs. 
Bra[!g, et al, 67 Utah 60; 245 Pac. 966 it is said 
that: 
'' 'l1hough court may have jurisdiction of sub-
ject matter and person, it may 'not act or make 
an order or render a judgment beyond or in 
excess of jurisdiction.'' 
"vVhile requisite jurisdictional facts need 
not he reeited in order or judgment to properly 
invest court with jurisdiction of subject matter, 
they must somewhere be made to appears in re-
cord that describes matter for court's adjudica-
tion and is foundation of judgment or order." 
'' J udf.,"''llent which is beyond or not supported 
hy pleadings must fail.'' 
".Judgment mm;t fail on showing on face of 
mandatory record that it was obtained at variance 
with practice of court or contrary to well recog-
nized principles and fundamentals of law." 
''Fact apparent from mandatory record, 
showing that fundamental law was disregarded 
in establishing of judgment, will render it void 
for all purposes.'' 
"Judt,rment founded on record, showing that 
fundamenta·J law was disregarded in its establish-
ment, is suh,ject to direct and collateral attack, 
and will sua sponte he noticed by courts and acted 
upon by them without regard to wishes or re-
lations of parties named on record." 
rrhe foregoing quotations are from the syllabi to 
thP opinion and reflect the opinion of the court. 
' I 
~ ·~ 
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The law with respect to the necessity of judgment or 
decree being supported by pleadings, is discussed in 
Vol. 1 Freerna,n on Judgments 6 Ed. Sec. ~)7, pag1e 168. 
49 C. J. 8. page 95, et seq., sections 40 and 41. 
ln connection with such law it will be noted that 
there is nothing in the complaint which even remotely 
indicates that plaintiff in 2888 sought to foreclose a 
mortgage on certificates 72 or 73 or any other water 
represented by certificates or any water right which was 
appurtenant to any particular tract of land. So far as 
is made to appear from the allegations of the complaint 
the plaintiff may have sought to foreclose its mortgage 
on any GO acres or shares of water right owned by R. H. 
Spencer. 
Much of the controversy in the court below centered 
around certificates numbered 72 and 78. 'l'he facts re-
lating to these certificates show: On either .Tune 1, 1918 
or Nov. 2:J, ] 931, Richard H. Spencer and Annie Spencer 
attempted to convey 160 shares of Class "A" stock to 
the T ndianola Irrigation Company. (See Indianola Irri-
gation Company FJxhihit 5) The acknowledgment of the 
notary sa~Ts that Richard H. Spencer and Annie Spencer, 
his wife, together with a nmnher of others acknowledged 
the conve~1ance on .Tune 1, 1918. There is some evidence 
that the conveyance was actually made on N ovemher 25, 
1931. (See Tr. 267) It of course may he that R. H. Spen-
cer executed the instrument twice, that is to say, his 
original Hignature may have become detached from the 
original instrument so that it became necessary to have 
Mr. Spencer sign again. 
It would he a very dangerous precedent to set by 
our courts to say that an acknowledgment of an instru-
ment which appears regular on its face f'hould he held 
for nought by the statement of a witness testifying after 
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the lapse of 16 years that the witness signed at a later 
date. 'i'he most that can possibly be said for such testi-
mony is that it carries an inference that it was not signed 
before. It will further be noted that a red ink line is 
drawn through the words: "dated this 25th day of 
November, 19i31.'' Such lines were drawn through the 
instrument when it was recorded. (See Tr. 43) It would 
seem that the only possible reason for drawing the red 
ink line through the date was to indicate that there was 
something wrong with the date. If the acknowledgment 
shows the instrument was actually orignally signed on 
the date of the acknowledgment the way to make that 
evident would be to strike out as was done the words: 
''dated this 25th day of November, 1931.'' 
\Vhatever the fact may be in such particular we do 
not, in the light of other facts appearing in the evidence, 
deem it of special importance. 
1t will be seen that the deed, Indianola Irrigation 
Company Exhibit 5, does not describe any particular 
water right conveyed or intended to be conveyed to the 
company. It would have been a simple matter for the one 
who drew the deed to have designated the particular 
water right that was intended to he conveyed hy des-
cribing the land to which it was appurtenant. If that had 
heen done this litigation wo~:Ild prohahly not have arisen. 
So long as deeds are drawn which do not meet the require-
ments of the law with respect to the description of the 
property conveyed, confusion and 'litigation is almost 
certain to follow. 
We, therefore, contend that the deed which Spencer 
made to the Indianola Irrigation Company is void for 
uncertainity in that an attempt was made to convey to 
the company a part of a larger number of acres of water 
without placing in the instrument of conveyance any 
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information whatever which could identify the property 
intended to be conveyed. 
In connection with what we have said about the 
necessity of conveyance being certain and definite we 
direct the attention of the court to U. C. A. 1943-100-1-11 
wherein it is provided that: "water rights shall he trans-
ferred by deed in substantially the same manner as real 
estate." But assuming that some water right was con-
veyed to the Irrigation Company how stands the case7 
In case numbered 2888 and in this case the defendant 
Indianola Irrigation Company sought to have certificates 
numbered 72 and 73 cancelled because it claimed that 
Richard Spencer had secured the issuance of such 
certificates by representing that he had that amount of 
stock free and clear of encumberances. We shall presently 
point out in detail the facts in such particular. For the 
present if it he assumed that certificates numbered 72 
and 73 were subject to cancellation and that the court 
properly cancelled such certificates in this action it 
necessarily follows that the water right represented by 
such certificates is and has been appurtenant to the land 
upon which the water was and has been used since long 
before the organization of the irrigation company. So far 
as we are advised the adjudicated cases and the text 
writers are agreed that when a contract is rescinded the 
parties thereto are placed in the same position as they 
were in before the contract was entered into. The law is 
thus stated in 12 Am . .Jur., page 1031, Sec. 451: 
''The very idea of rescinding a contract im-
plies that what has been parted with shall be re-
stored on both sides. Releasing one party from 
his part of the agreement and excusing him from 
making the other party whole do not seem agree-
able to reason or justice. Hence, the general rule 
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is that a party who wishes to rescind an agreement 
must place the opposite party in status quo.'' 
rrhe results are the same regardless of the reasons 
for making the reseision. Thus in its final analysis it is 
not of controlling importance whether the transaction 
whereby Spencer executed a purported deed to the com-
pany for certificates 72 and 7:3 which purported deed is 
void for uncertainty hecause not describing the water 
right attempted to be conveyed or whether the transaction 
is set aside heeause of misrepresentation made by Spen-
cer. In either event the water right is appurtenant to the 
land. That is to say the water right would be the 
same as if no deed of conveyance had been made or at-
tempted to he made. F'rom what has heen said, however, 
we do not concede the evidence shows that Speneer made 
any misrepresentations touching the number of unen-
rumhered shares of stock he had when he made a deed to 
the company. 'l'he evidence shows the follows: 
Spem~er mortgage to the Federal Building and Loan 
As:soeiation was not for 28;) slmres or acres of water 
hut 22:~ acres. (See Indianola Irrigation Company's 
exhibit 1) He made a mortgage to Hugentohler for G5 
acres. There were ~) acres appurtenant to a small a tract 
of Janel conveyed. Add to this the lGO acres of water 
which \vas attempted to be conve.ved to the company we 
have a total of 441 acres. 'l'here is some evidence that a 
water rig1Jt was allocated to the cemetery lot and we 
have heretofore directed the attention of the court to 
the testimony to the effect that U. H. Spencer, at one 
76 
time, used some water on a tract of Indian land, the deed 
to wliich he lost. ('Jlr. 390) It will be seen that all of the 
448 acres of water is accounted for, except the 60 acres 
claimed by the plaintiff. 
rrhere is nothing in the mortgage to indicate whether 
it is a first or a second mortgage. It does appear that the 
bank was out to get all the security that Spencer had 
available. 
1f nch of the difficulty that the Indianola Irrigation 
Company finds itself in is due to the fact that it gave to 
the F'ederal Building and Loan Association 285 shares 
of stock and now seeks to claim that Richard H. Spencer 
was responsible therefor when in truth and in fact the 
difficulty was apparently brought about by the company 
having issued certificates of stock to H. M. Spencer (the 
sons of R. H. Spencer and one of the mortgagors of the 
property mortgaged to the Federal Building and Loan 
Association) which stock H. M. Spencer mortgaged to 
the Commercial Bank of Spanish l~'ork. 'L'he Company 
then made a second issue of stock for the same water 
right to the Federal Building and Loan Association. The 
Indianola Irrigation Company is now apparently quite 
willing to have the decree in this case award to plaintiff 
\Vhittaker 60/1728 and to Hugentobler 55/1728 of all the 
class '' B '' water rights of its stockholders notwithstand-
ing there is not one scintilla of evidence to justify such 
an award. We say that because it is reasonable to assume 
that the Indianola Irrigation Company took part in 
formulating the decree in this case. Be that as it may it 
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has not yet raised its voice in protest against the obvious 
fact that both Whittaker and Hugentobler have been 
awarded more water than they are entitled to, namely: 
60/1728 and 55/1728, not only of class "A" water rights 
but also of the class "B" water of Thistle Creek and its 
tributaries. 
Plaintiff also claims that the Spencers may not pre-
vail in their attack on his title to the sixty shares because: 
1. Both Richard H. Spencer and John Edison 
Spencer have in the present action disclaimed any in-
terest to the water right in controversy. 
2. That by reason of the judgment rendered in case 
2888 the matter of ownership of the right to the sixty 
shares has been adjudicated. 
As to plaintiff's claim that R. H. Spencer and John 
E~dison Spencer have disclaimed any interest in the water 
in dispute in the present case the pleadings filed herein 
show that the water right claimed by the plaintiff was 
to the right to the use of water to irrigate 60 acres of 
land in Section 3, Township 12 South, Range 4 East, 
Salt Lake Meridian. (See paragraph 14 of complaint R. 
7 and 8) 
To the complaint John Edison Spencer and Richard 
H. Spencer filed their motion to strike on various 
grounds: Among the portions of the complaint so sought 
to be stricken were the first 11 lines of paragraph 14. 
(R. 41-44) 
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Richard H. Spencer and John Edison Spencer also 
filed a demurrer to the complaint on various grounds, 
among them being that it could not be ascertained from 
the complaint what water right the plaintiff claimed and 
particularly that it could not be ascertained from said 
complaint what particular land in Section 3, if any, the 
alleged water of the plaintiff was ever used. 
The demurrer was upon the ground that plaintiff's 
claim to a water right was barred by various provisions 
of the statute of limitation. (J.R. 48-49) The disclaimer 
upon which plaintiff relies reads 'as follows: 
''Comes now Richard H. Spencer and John 
Edison Spencer (spelled John Edson Spencer in 
plaintiff's complaint) each for himself and not 
one for the other and for answer to plaintiff's 
complaint alleges: 
Defendants disclaim all right, title or interest 
of whatsoever character or extent, in or to any 
and all of the premises and water rights described 
in plaintiff's complaint and especially that parti-
cular alleged water right described in paragraph 
VIV of plaintiff's complaint." 
Larson and Larson 
Attorneys for the defendants 
Richard H. Spencer and John 
Edison Spencer. 
The answer and disclaimer is verified by R. H. Spen-
cer and John Edison Spencer. (J.R. 52-53 and 54) 
It would seem clear from the pleadings above refer-
red to and quoted that the subject matter therof was 
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water used for the irrigation of Section 3 and no other. 
It could not be said to refer to the water right repre-
sented by certificates 72 or 73 because the same were 
not mentioned or referred to in the pleadings of the 
plaintiff nor were the same mentioned in the decree of 
foreclosure. 
l\f oreover the plaintiff could not well have claimed 
any rights to the waterright represented by certificates 
84 or 86 because the water right represented by such 
certificates come out of the water right which was fore-
closed by the Federal Building and Loan Association's 
proceeding in which proceeding W. H. Hadlock, John A. 
1\falia, state bank commissioner of Utah, for the use and 
benefit of the creditors of the North Sanpete Bank, a 
corporation, were parties defendants and were foreclosed 
from making any claim to the water appurtenant to the 
land and water right which was appurtenant to the land 
covered by their mortgage, including the 223 acres of 
water which R. H. Spencer mortgaged to that corpora-
tion. The Indianola Irrigation Company was also a de-
fendant in such action and any right that it might have 
to the water covered by the Federal Building and Loan 
Association's mortgage was likewise cut off and disposed 
of. It thus remained for the plaintiff and the Indianola 
Irrigation Company to seek some means to get at certifi-
cates numbered 72 and 73 to make up for their failure 
to appear in the foreclosure proceeding of the Federal 
Building and Loan Association and defend such rights 
as they might have to the water right there involved. 
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As we have repeatedly said there is not a scintilla 
of evidence in this case which shows or tends to show 
that the plaintiff ever had or at any time prior to the 
present proceeding even claimed any right to certificates 
numbered 72 or 73 or to the water right which was appur-
tenant to the lands in section 5 to which such water right 
was appurtenant. We repeat that such results were 
brought about because the mortgage given to Hadlock, 
Bank Commissioner and the deed given to the Irrigation 
Company were so vague and uncertain that no one could 
ascertain from the language used therein what water 
right was intended to be mortgaged or conveyed. It is be-
cause of the results that followed in the wake of such a 
method of attempting to convey mortgaged property that 
the courts have uniformly held that the same are void. In 
this connection it should be noted that at the time John 
Edison Spencer made the disclaimer he had every reason 
to believe and did believe that the title to the water right 
represented by certificates numbered 72 and 73 belonged 
to Price. (Tr. 599 et seq.) 
The plaintiff has pleaded res judicata and an estop-
pel as against both the administrator and John Edison 
Spencer and in his reply plaintiff's counsel in the court 
below argued such questions at considerable length at the 
conclusion of the trial. Of course if the mortgage given to 
Hadlock, the decree of foreclosure and the deeds to the 
Bank Commissioner and to Spencer are valid there can 
be no doubt but that the Spencers are estopped from 
asserting any claim to the water right disposed of in 
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such proceeding and the conveyances made in pursuance 
thereof. We have not and shall not contend to the con-
trary. On the other hand if the mortgage given by R. H. 
Spencer to the bank on 60 shar:es or acres of water right 
and the proceedings had to foreclose the same or the 
deeds given ofter the mortgage was foreclosed are so 
uncertain and ambiguous in the matter of describing the 
subject matter as to .render the same void then and in 
such case the doctrines of estoppel and res judicata have 
no application. We will be interested in having counsel 
for plaintiff cite a case or other authority where it is 
held that a void decree or document may work either on 
estoppel or be aided by res judicata. \Ve understand the 
law to be that a void instrument is wholly without legal 
effect for any purpose. 
It will also be noted that by the decree entered in 
this case a cloud is cast upon all of the water rights of 
'l'histle Creek and its tributaries. It does not describe 
any water right by either reference to certificates of 
stock or by a description of the land to which it is ap-
purtenant. Any one purchasing or taking any of the 
water rights of 'rhistle Creek will be unable to ascertain 
what particular water right is awarded to plaintiff. The 
fact that plaintiff is unable to identify his claimed water 
right doeH not entitle him to a decree clouding all the 
water rights in Thistle Creek. 
In connection with the water right claimed by the 
plaintiff the court's attention is again called to the deed 
which Richard H. Spencer gave to John Edison Spencer 
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m September of 1933 (See John Edison Spenoor's Ex-
hibit 12) and the fact that he has been in possession of 
that property, together with the water right used thereon 
since that time and it is reasonable to assume that he has 
paid the taxes on such land, together with the water used 
to irrigate the same ever since the same was conveyed to 
him. This action was not brought until July 21, 1941, 
more than seven years after John Edison Spencer re-
ceived the conveyance above mentioned, which it will be 
observed conveyed to him 80 acres of water right in 
Thistle Creek. It wiH also be noted that John Edison 
Spencer did not sign the mortgage which plaintiff 
sought to foreclose in cause numbered 2888. Under such 
a state of the record the plaintiff has lost any right to the 
water used upon the land which land and water right was 
so conveyed to John Edison Spencer. U.C.A. 1943, 100-1-4 
and Hammond vs. Johnson 94 Ut. 20; 66 P. (2d) 894 . 
• John Edison Spencer held and used both the land and 
water adversely to the plaintiff and its claimed grantor 
or mortgagor, Hichard H. Spencer, for more than the 
statutory period. 
It will be noted that the trial court awarded judg-
ment against .John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. 
Tibbs jointly and severally in favor of the plaintiff for 
costs taxed at $75.80, (J.R. 273) and likewise awarded 
judt,'"Inent in favor of the defendant Indianola Irrigation 
Company, a corporation, and against John Edison Spen-
cer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs jointly and severally costs 
taxed at $154.40. We have assigned such awards as er-
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ror. (Assignments 42 and 45.) We are at a loss to under-
stand upon what theory such an award was made. If 
eosts have any relation whatsoever to the degree of fault 
that the party has been guilty of in an action certainly 
if there was fauJt it was primarilythe fault of Richard 
H. Spencer. So far as Elizabeth A. Tibbs is concerned 
she was an onlooker. If any costs should be awarded 
(which we contend it sholl'ld not be) in favor of either the 
plaintiff or the Indianola Irrigation Company we submit 
that it should be against the administrator and not 
against either John Edison Spencer or Elizabeth A. 
Tibbs. 
rl'HE WATER RIGHTS INVOLVED IN THIS CON-
TROVEHSY ARE APPURTENANT TO LANDS 
OWNED BY JOHN EDISON SPENCER AND ELIZA-
BETH A. TIBBS. 
The trial court found that the water rights claimed 
by John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs are not 
appurtenant to the lands conveyed to them by Richard H. 
Spencer. We have assigned such finding as error in as-
si.L,rnments numbered 17 and 22, 24, 25, 26 and 27. 
Whether or not water represented by stock m a 
mutual irrigation company is appurtenant to land so 
that it will pass with a deed to the land as an appurten-
ance is a question of fact to be decided in each case. The 
mere fact that water is represented by stock certificates in 
a ~ater company is in no sense controlling. The question 
was first before our Utah Supreme Court in 1898 in the 
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case of Smith vs. North Canyon Wa.t,er Company, 16 Ut. 
194. The court there held that water represented by 
stock in a water company was under the facts of that 
case appurtenant to the land in question. The court has 
consistent!ly from that date forward treated the problem 
as a fact question and as recently as October of 1945 
reaffirmed the rule that water represented by stock in a 
water company could in law be appurtenant to the land 
upon which the water was used. See Milford State Bank 
vs. West Field Canal & Irr. Co., 100 Utah 528, 162 P. 2d. 
101. The Utah cases have never treated the fact that the 
water was represented by the stock in a corporation as 
controlling. 
In the Milford State Bank vs. West Field Carnal & 
lrr. Co., c:ase, supra, the owner of the land had conveyed 
it by instruments placed in escrow, together with all 
water and water rights thereunto be'longing. By inadver-
tence a certificate purpoting to represent 49 shares of 
water in a corporation was deposited in escrow with the 
land contract. The seller contended that only a portion 
( 28 shares) of the 49 had ever been used on the land and 
argued that all that was conveyed by the agreement was 
the land and the water which was appurtenant thereto. 
The Supreme Court adopted this view and said: (p. 536 
of the Utah reports). 
''The record is sufficient to sustain the find-
ing that Blackner bought the lands from Mrs. 
Daker with the appurtenant water right: that the 
appurtenant water right was 28 shares of the 
capitol stock of the irrigation company on the 
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basis of one share of stock to each acre of land. 
Shares of stock of an irrigation company issued 
in place of the vested water right for lands in an 
irrigation district are appurtenant unless they 
have been transferred and put to a beneficial use 
upon other lands.'' 
The court had a like problem before it in Ea~t 
River Bottom Water Co. vs. Boyce, 102 Utah 149, 128 P. 
2d. 277, (1942). There had been a duplicate issue of seven 
shares of water stock in the plaintiff company. This 
duplicate issue was represented by a stock certificate 
which had been pledged to a bank as security for a loan. 
Suit was brought by the irrigation company to have the 
duplicate issue declared void. The bank defended on the 
grounds that it was a bona fide purchaser without notice. 
The Supreme Court decided against the bank holding that 
the water in the irrigation company was still appurtenant 
to the land and charged the bank with notice of this fact. 
'l'he court said: 
"The corporation was a loose sort of a mut-
ual agreement for the unified management and 
distribution of the water to the owners. The 
limited and restrictive words for the purpose of 
'control, management and distribution' is not a 
conveyance separating a water right from the 
land does not vest title or the right of use in the 
corporation within the provisions of Revised Sta-
tutes of Utah 1933, Section 100-1-10 and Section 
100-1-1. .. The water right was never severed 
from the land and is still appurtenant thereto." 
The best discussion of this problem in the Utah 
cases is contained in Re: Johnson's Estate, 64 Utah 114, 
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228 P. 748, (1924). There, by will, a testator devised 
specified lands to certain of his children. The remaining 
children were named as the residual legatees. In the 
devise of the land the testator failed to mention water 
rights for the land. The water was represented by stock 
in a corporation and during his life the water represen-
ted by this stock had been used on the lands specifically 
devised. The residual legatees contended that the stock 
was personal property and came to them as a part of the 
residue of the estate. The other children, to whom the 
land had been devised, contended that the stock was 
appurtenant to the land devised and passed with it as an 
appurtenance even though the will had failed to mention 
it. The Supreme Court held that the water was appur-
tenant. The problem of water represented by stock in a 
corporation being appurtenant to land was discussed in 
some detail. The court said: 
''Appellants, claiming the 44 remaining 
shares of water stock as an appurtenant to tract 
A of the real estate, prayed for its distribution to 
them. It was alleged and not denied that the water 
right was used in connection with the land, and 
that the land is of little or no value without the 
water right. The trial court found that the water 
right had been used for the irrigation of the lands 
owned by the testator, but that notwithstanding 
such use the same was personal property, and 
was not included in the devise to appellants. The 
question is whether a water right so owned and 
used will pass by the devise, without mention, with 
the land as an appurtenance ... " (then followed 
citation of and quotations from the statutes which 
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were what are now sections 100-1-10 and 100-1-11, 
U.C.A. 1943) 
Hcferring to what is now section 100-1-10 which provides 
in part: 
''Water rights shall be transferred by deeds 
in substantially the same manner as real estate, 
except when they are represented by shares of 
stock in a corporation . · " 
1'he court said: 
''The latter provisiOn is obviously intended 
for the conveyance of water rights in cases where 
the water rights are severed from the land upon 
which the water has been used, and separately 
conveyed. In such a case if the water right is 
represented by shares of stock in a corporation, 
the plain implication is that it may be transferred 
by a transfer of the certificate of stock, in the 
ordinary manner, as personal property. But that 
does not necessarily mean that water rights thus 
represented may not be an appurtenance to the 
land upon which the water is used, and pass as 
such with a conveyance of the land." 
The court then quoted with approval from Weil on 
vV ater Rights, 3d. l~d. Sec. 1269 (which is quoted below 
in this brief under heading "Text Writers", and also 
cited with approval cases from Washington, Idaho and 
California, and distinguished an earlier Utah case which 
while using some language indicating a different view 
is not in conflict with the other Utah cases. It was then 
::-;tated that whether water represented by stock is ap-
purtenant is a fact question. The court went on to con-
88 
elude that under the facts of that case the water rights 
represented by water stock were appurtenant to the lands 
devised. Said the court : 
''The right to the use of water for irrigation 
is inseparately related to land. Without its con-
tinued use upon land the right ceases. The custom-
ary practical presumption is that water rights 
used upon lands are appurtenant to and a part of 
it ... " 
"Upon principle and authority we conclude 
that the water right referred to passed by the will 
as an appurtenance to the land selected by the 
executor, and that the same should be distributed 
to the appellants with the land." 
Other Utah cases have touched Qn the problem. In 
1898 it was presented to the court in Smith vs. Nlorth 
Canyon. Wat1er Co., 16 Utah 194. There a deed to lands 
failed to mention water. 'l'he water in question was rep-
resented by stock. The court held that the water passed 
with the land as an appurtenance. 
In Cortella vs. Salt Lake City, 93. Utah 236, land 
owners exchanged their water for canal water from the 
private canal of Salt Lake City. The contention was that 
the water was made personal property because reduced 
'to possession by the city in its canal. The court held that 
even though so reduced to possession in a private canal 
the water was still appurtenant to the land because it was 
used thereon in exchange for waters that had been ap-
purtenant. No stock in a corporation was involved, but 
the case is helpful because it is generally held that water, 
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reduced to possession in a private canal, is personal prop-
erty. Yet the court held that the water was an appurten-
ant (real property) because of its use and the nature of 
the exchange agreement. 
In Genol,a Town vs. Swntaquin City, 96 Utah 88, 80 
P. 2d 930 the court noted the peculiar nature of owner-
ship of stock in a mutual irrigation company. It said: 
(page 101) 
"Stock in a mutual company entails the right 
to demand such stockholders aliquot share of the 
water in proportion as his stock holding bears to 
all the stock. Water rights are pooled in a mutual 
company for convenience of operation and more 
efficient distribution, and perhaps for more con-
venient transfer. But the stock certificate is not 
like the stock certificate in a company operated 
for profit. It is really a certificate showing an 
undivided part ownership in a certain water sup-
ply. It embraces the right to call for such un-
divided part according to the method of distri-
bution.'' 
To the same effect see Smithfield vs. Union Central Life, 
105 Utah 468. 
In Fisher vs. Bovumtiful City, 21 Ut:ah 29, plaintiffs 
and others associated together under the name of Barton 
Creek Irrigation Company. Bountiful sought to control 
and manage the distribution of their water rights. At 
page 34 of the Utah reports the court held that the rights 
of the plaintiffs were appurtenant to their lands. It does 
not clearly appear, except from the name of the company, 
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whether or not the water rights were represented by 
stock. 
In Woolley 1:s. Dowse, 86 Utah 221, it wa~ held that 
the water in question wa~ not appurtenant to land which 
had been mortgaged. The holding was placed on the 
grounds that the water was not in fact used on the land 
rather than upon the ground~ that it was stock in a 
mutual company. The fact that the holding was put on 
the ground~ that it wa~ not appurtenant in fact because 
not used on the land rather than on the fact that it was 
stock in a mutual company shows that the court did not 
consider that fact to be controlling. 
In Geo.rge v. Robinson, 23 Ut. 79, the court held the 
water there involved was not apputtenant. The suit was 
for breach of warranty. Plaintiff was grantee under a 
deed conveying land and appurtenances. Thereafter de-
fendant lost use of the water and sued for breach of 
warranty. The water was represented by stock in an 
irrigation company. In holding that the water was not 
appurtenant to the land the court noted various things 
which it apparently con~idered to be important in arriv-
ing at that conclusion. lt said: 
"In fact, the fair result of plaintiff's own 
testimony is to the effect that the water of Corn 
Creek, of which that in dispute is a part, is and 
was owned by the corporation; that each share 
of ih; capital stock represented sufficient water to 
irrigate one acre of land; and that stockholders 
only were entitled to water for purposes of irri-
gation. There is nothing to show that any parti-
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cular share of stock represented any water for 
any particular land. So far as appears from the 
proof, each stockholder had the right to use the 
water to which he was entitled on any land he 
saw fit. Under such arrangements ... the water 
cannot be appurtenant." 
lt further appears in that case that the grantor in the 
deed did not own any water and the grantee knew that 
sueh was the fact. Again the court failed to place the 
holding on the fact that the water was represented by 
stock. It reasoned as to whether it was appurtenant 
in fact and based its holding on the conclusion that it 
was not. Any language in the case indicating that water 
in a water eompany could not be appurtenant to land 
was overruled by the later opinion of In Re Johnson's 
Estate, supra, where George v. Robinson is expressly 
noted. 
1'here is not a single Utah case which was disclosed 
hy our search where the court has held that water in 
a water corporation cannot in law be appurtenant to land. 
1'he cases uniformly treat the matter as question of fact. 
\VHEN IS WA'l'ER APPURTENANT1 
lf it be accepted, as well it must, that water repre-
sented by stock may or may not be appurtenant to land 
depending upon whether or not it is appurtenant in fact, 
then our problem· is to determine when water is appur-
tenant. This is am;wered in the case of Thompson v. 
McKinney, 91 Ut. 89, 63 P. 2d 1056. The suit was an ac-
tion to quiet title to lands and waters claimed to be 
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appurtenant thereto. The question was whether or not 
certain waters were in fact appurtenant to certain lands. 
Tl1e water was not represented by stock in a corporation. 
The court discussed many cases dealing with the ques-
tion of when water is appurtenant in fact. The court 
rejected the contention that only those waters which 
were "indispensable" to the use of land were appur-
tenant. It quoted with approval from 2 Kinney on Irr. 
and \Vater Rights, (2d Ed.), Sec. 1011, p. 1904 as follows: 
"r.l'he doctrine is well settled in the States of 
the arid region, that a water right used in connec-
tion with a certain tract of land for the irrigation 
thereof, where necessary to the beneficial enjoy-
ment of the land, together with the ditch, canal, 
or other works necessary to conduct the water to 
the place of use, become appurtenances to the 
land provided they are all owned by the same 
parties.'' 
This idea of being owned by the same parties is not 
in conflict with the concept that water represented by 
stock can be appurtenant because of the holding in cases 
such as East River Bottom v. Boyce, supra, 102 Utah 
149, supra, and Genola Town v. Santaquin, 96 Utah 88, 
supra, holding that the owner of the stock certificate 
is in fact an owner in common with the other stockholders 
of the water. The same concept formed the basis of a 
later opinion by the Supreme Court in Smithfield W. 
Bench Irr. Co. v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 105 Ut. 
468, 142 P. 2d 866. The court there said: 
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''The waters of a mutual irrigation com-
pany belong to the users, the company being the 
mere distributing and apportioning trustee ... 
The Company cannot sell any of the water without 
consent of the stockholders or for nonpayment 
of dues if the articles of incorporation make the 
stock liable for such costs and expenses. Like-
wise the company cannot permit the water to be 
lost by non-use thereof as long as any share-
holder desires to and is in a position to use the 
water. Water undistributed may be used by any 
stockholder in a position to use it. The share-
holders are in effect owners in common of the 
waters with certain limitations as , between one 
another governing the use thereof.'' Citing many 
cases. 
In the Thompson v. McKinney case, supra, the court 
also quoted with approval from a Montana case Lensing 
v. Day, 67 Mont. :182, 215 P. 999, as follows: 
"A water right, acquired by appropriation 
and used for a beneficial and necessary purpose 
in connection with a given tract of land, is an 
appurtenance thereto, and as such passes with 
the conveyance of the land unless expressly re-
served from the grant." 
It must be concluded that whenever water is ap-
propriated for use on particular lands and is so used 
thereon for beneficial purposes it becomes appurtenant 
to that land. For other cases discussing the problem 
of when water becomes appurtenant to land see Kinney, 
Water Rights, 2d Ed., Sec. 1005-1016; Connant v. Deep 
Creek & Curlow Valley Irr. Co., 23 Ut. 627, 66 P. 188; 
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Utah .Metal & 'runnel Company v. Groesbeck, 62 Utah 
251, 219 P. 248. 
Once it is established that the water is in fact ap-
purtenant to land (and this is always a question of fact) 
then the cases are numerous holding that it passes with 
a conveyanee of the land without being mentioned in the 
deed of conveyance. In Black v. Johnson, 81 Utah 410, 
it was held that tax deed conveying lands sold for taxes 
carried with it "one city lot of water right" even though 
not mentione(l in the tax deed. In Thompson v. M ciCin-
n,ey, 91 Ut. 89, 6~~ P. 2d 105G it was held that a mortgage 
on lands also mortgaged the water which was appur-
tenant to it even though no mention of the water was 
made in the mortgage. See also the recent case of Petro-
fesa v. Rio Gra;nde R. R Co., 110 Utah------, 169 P. 2d 808 
decided in .June, 1946; Anderson v. Hanson, ;)0 Utah 149, 
167 P. 254; LeBCie v. Smith, 64 Ut. 242, 229 P. 88. 
'rl1JXT\VRITEHS ALL HOLD '1_1HAT WATER RBJP-
RB~SENTED BY STOCK IN A MU'L'UAL COMPANY 
CAN BE AND OFTPJN IS APPUR'l'FJNANT TO LAND 
AND THAT IN J;jACH CAS I~ Fr IS A QUFJSTTON 
OF FACT. 
The writers of text hooks on water right::; all agree 
with the Utah cases above cited that water represented 
by stock in a mutual company can be and often is ap-
purtenant to the land upon which used. Whether it is 
or IS not in each case is a question of fact. Quotation 
from W eil, the leading writer on western water law is 
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representative of the pervailing legal thought on this 
matter. 
In W eil on Wat<er Ri.ghts Section 1269, (cited with 
approval by the Utah Supreme Court in Tn re: .Johnson's 
Estate, 64 Ut. 114) it is stated: 
''So long as the company remains purely 
a mutual one, the certificate of stock represents 
the water right. A transfer or sale of the certi-
fteate is governed by much the same rules as those 
elsewhere considered regarding transfers of 
water rights. Whether the water right is an ap-
purtenance to the stockholders land is a ques-
tion of fact in each case, as is also whether on 
a sale of the land the water right passes as an 
appurtenance. A sale of the certificate may be 
made separate from the land for use on other 
land and will transfer the water right ... On the 
other hand in the absence of any separate sale 
of the certificate or of any other evidence of any 
express intention to make a severance, a sale of 
the land on which the water is used will carry the 
water right and the right to the certificate as an 
appurtenance.'' 
The section is also cited with approval in lkrq 1'.· Yakima 
C. Co., 83 Wash. 451, 145 P. 619. 
In Kinney on lrrigati·on and Water Rights, Sec. 1484, 
the rule is stated that water represented by stock in a 
water company generally is not appurtenant. He, how-
ever, cites cases from California holding in accord with 
the Utah rule and the rule stated by Weil. 
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Hu,tchirngs, Selected Problems of the Law of Water 
Rights in the West, p. 385 cites Weil with approval for 
proposition that appurtenancy is a question of fact. 
CASES FOR MOTHER STATES: 
1tVestern states uniformly hold that water repre-
sented by stock in a mutual company may he and often 
is appurenant to land. 
CALIFORNIA: In Re: Thomas Estate, 147 Cal. 
236, 81 P. 539, it was ·held that the conveyance of land 
by the original owner of a water right which was ap-
purtenant to a certain tract of land to a mutual water 
corporation, for the better management and distribution 
of the water, did not segregate the water from the land 
as such appurtenance, but merely changed its form; and, 
hence under the Civil Code, Section 1311, providing that 
every devise of land conveys all the estate of the devisor, 
and therefore, that a devise of land carried with it the 
share of stock in the company as appurtenant to the land; 
and therefore, it was entirely proper for the trial court 
to direct a transfer of stock to the devisee. 
COLORADO: Denv,er Joint Land Bank v. Mark-
ham, 107 P. 2d 313: Here the Court said: 
"Where the water right is appurtenant to 
the stockholder's land is a question of fact, as 
is also whether, on a sale or transfer of the land, 
the water right passes as an appurtenance * • • 
The doctrine which makes it a question of fact 
whether the water right is appurtenant to the 
land and whether it passes by a lease or other 
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conveyance seems to us sound." (Citing other 
Colorado cases.) 
Comstock v. Olney Sp·ring & Drain.age Dist., Colo. 50 P. 
2d 531. 
'' * * * where the company is a mutual irri-
gation company, or as here, a mutual reservoir 
company, organized, not for profit, but for the 
convenience of its members in the management 
of the irrigation system and in the distribution 
to them of water upon their lands * * * owner-
ship of shares of stock in the corporation is but 
incidental to ownership of water right, which 
is appurtenant to the land upon which the water 
is used . .'' 
IDAHO: Ireton 1'. idaho Irr. Co., 30 Idaho 310, 164 
P. fi87, 689: 
Action to foreclose real estate mortgage. It was 
denied that the water right, represented by stock, was 
real property appurtenant to the land and argued that 
it was not covered by the mortgage on the land. The 
court held to the contrary stating: 
''While this court has held shares in an 
irrigation company to be personal property the 
faet must not be lost sight of that a water right 
is, as heretofore shown, real estate, and that in 
case of a mutual irrigation company, not or-
ganized for profit, but for the convenience of its 
members in the management of the irrigation 
system and in the distribution to them of water 
for use upon their lands in proportion to their 
stock in the corporation is but incidental to the 
ownership of water right. Such shares are muni-
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ments of title to the water right, are inseparable 
from it and ownership of them passes with title 
which ·they evidence.'' 
\¥ ASHINCVrON: Berg v. Yak:ima Valley Canal Oo., 
~:1 Wash. 451, 145 P. 619: 
The question involved was whether or not water 
rights represented by stock certificates passed with a 
lease of lands. 'Jlhe contention was made that they were 
not appurtenant and would not pass as an appurten-
ance. 'l'he court held to the contrary stating: 
'' ln a mutual company the stock certificate 
represents the water right. A transfer or sale of 
the certificate may be made separate from the 
land for use on other land, and will transfer the 
water right. But where it has not been thus sold 
or transferred, the question whether the water 
right is appurtenant to the stockholder's land 
is generally a question of fact, as is also whether, 
on a sale or transfer of the land, the water right 
pass as an appurtenance * * * In the present case 
the water was appurtenant to the land." 
:MONTANA: See Yellowstone ValLsy Co. vs. Asso-
ciated M ortga.ge Investors, Inc., et al. 88 M ant. 73, 290 
P. 255. 
FEDEJRAL: Ack'royd vs. Winst:on, 113 Fed. 2nd 
G57. This case arose under the laws of the State of Mon-
tana and the Circuit Court discusses cases from several 
western states including Utah and concludes that water 
represented by stock in a mutual company can be and 
is often appurtenant to land. It also holds that whether 
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it is appurtenant in a particular case is a question of fact. 
THE INDIANOLA IRRIGATION COMPANY IS A 
MUTUAL IRRIGATION COMPANY 
Article 6 of the Articles of Incorporation of the In-
rlianola Irrigation Company provides: 
"The purpose for which this corporation is 
formed and the pursuit and business to be en-
gaged in is to manage, regulate, control and dis-
tribute the waters of Thistle Creek, its branches 
to and among its stockholders in proportion to 
their and each of their respective rights to the use 
thereof, to construct and maintain all such dams, 
ditches, canals, gates, reservoirs, flumes and 
other and different structures and means which 
may be found necessary or convenient for irri-
gation and other purposes.'' 
r t will thus be seen that the corporation was not, by its 
articles, authorized to own the water in its systems but 
only to manage, regulate, control and distribute the 
waters, under the doctrine announcer! in the case of 
I~ast River Bottom Water Co. vs. Boyce, et al, supra, 
from which we have quoterl, the water under the In-
dianola Irrigation Company was appurtenant to the land 
of its stockholders. The water represented by certi-
ficates of stock in the Indianola Irrigation Company, is, 
as a matter of law, appurtenant to the land upon which 
~uch water has been and is being used. 
In the case of East River Bottom Water Co. vs. 
Boyce, et al, it will be noted that the majority opinion 
holds that a water right is not severed from being 
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appurtenant to land where the corporation is merely 
given the right to manage and control the water. It may 
or may not be that this court judicially or personally 
knows that when that case was decided many of the 
banks throughout the state that had loaned money on 
certificates of stock in irrigation companies became 
alarmed because under the doctrine of that case their 
security might become valueless. Be that as it may at 
the next session of the legislature following the render-
ing of that opinion the let,>"islature amended Section 
U.C.A. 1943, 100-1-10 so that the same should provide 
as follows: 
"Water rights shall be transferred by deed 
in substantially the same manner as real estate, 
except when they are represented by shares of 
stock in a corporation, in which case water shall 
not be deemed to be appurtenant to the land, and 
such deeds shall be recorded in books kept for 
that purpose in the office of the recorder of the 
county where the place of diversion of the water 
from its natural channel is situated and in the 
county where the water is applied. Every deed of 
a water right so recorded shall, from the time 
of filing the same with the recorder for record 
impart notice to all persons of the contents thereof 
and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and lien 
holders shall be deemed to purchase and take with 
notice thereof." Laws of Utah 1943, Chapter 105, 
page 154. 
The language in italics was added by the amend-
ment of 1943. U.C.A. 1943, 100-1-ll was not amended. 
It remained as it had been and provides as follows: 
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"A right to the use of water appurtenant to 
land shall pass to the grantee of such land, and, in 
oases where such right has been exercised in irri-
gating different parcels of land at different times, 
such right shall pass to the grantee of any par-
cel of land on which such right was exercised 
next preceeding the time of the execution of any 
conveyance thereof; subject, however, in all cases 
to payment by the grantee in any such conveyance 
of all amounts unpaid on any assessment then due 
upon any such right, provided, that any such 
. right to the use of water, or any part thereof, may 
be reserved by the grantor in any such convey-
ance by making such reservation in express terms 
in such conveyance, or it may be separately con-
veyed.'' 
THljJ Al\HJNDMENT TO SECTION 100-1-10, U.C.A. 
1943, ~fADI~ BY THE 1943 LEGISLATURJ<J DOES 
NOT HAVE TH:BJ EFFECT OF MAKING \VATER 
·wHICH WAS IN FACT APPURTENAN'l, TO LAND, 
NOT APPURTENANT. 
There can be no doubt that from earliest times the 
courts of this state and territory have held that water 
represented by stock in an irrigation company may be 
and usually is appurt.enant to the lands upon which the 
water is used. Mutual companies were organized throu-
out the west for the purpose of distributing and manag-
ing the water of the corporate members, such is the ex-
pressed purpose of the incorporators of the Indianola 
Irrigation Company. It has been uniformly held that the 
stockholders are tenants in· common of the water. See 
Smithfield West Field lrr. Co. vs. Union Cen,tral Life, 
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105 Utah 468; Genola Town vs. Santaquin City, 96 Utah 
88, 80 P. 2d 9i30. Certainly no farmer in turning over to a 
mutual company the right to distribute and manage his 
water ever intended to sever the water from the land. The 
Utah eases cited above all recognize this when they hold 
that water represented by stock is nevertheless still ap-
purtenant to the land upon which used. As will be herein-
after shown the legislature could not change the nature 
of the contract made by the stockholders among them-
selves in their articles without running afoul of the con-
stitutional limitation which prohibits the ,impairment of 
the obligation of contract. This should be kept in mind in 
approaching the problem of the construction of section 
100-1-10, as amended by the laws of 1943, wherein it is 
provided that water represented by stock in a corpor-
ation shall not be deemed appurtenant to land. 
The word ''deemed'' has been given two well recog-
nized meanings by the authorities and the one which is to 
be adopted in any particular instance depends upon the 
context. The two meanings are recognized by the stan-
dard law dictionaries. In 9 American and English Enc. 
165 it is defined as follows: 
'''Do deem means to judge ; to determine 
upon consideration; to form a judgn1en t; to con-
clude upon consideration. The term is also used 
in the ordinary sense ·Of to think to suppose; to 
hold opinion.'' 
This same definition is cited in Bou:nier, New Law 
Dictionary, 1934. See also Webster, New Inte.rnational 
Dictionary, which is as follows: 
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'' l. To pass judgment; to render decision; 
to aet as judge or arbitor . 
• 2. To have an opinion, to judge, believe, sup-
pose * * " 
In 13 Cyc. 756 the term is defined as to adjudge and 
also to suppose, to believe, to think. 
CASH~S HOLDING 'l'HAT TH11J vVOHDS 
"SHALL BE D~~J<JMED" 
RAISI~ ONLY A RJ,~BUTrPABLJ<~ PRESUMPTION 
Miller 'VS. Commonwealth, 2 S.E. 2d, 34:~, 172 
Va. G3D. Statute providing that liquor in contain-
ers not bearing the re(1uired government stamps 
shall he deemed to have been illegally acquired, 
created a presumption subject to being overcome 
by opposing evidence rather than a conclusive 
presumption. 
In re Barbour's Estate: 173 N.Y.S. 280, 185 
App. Div. 445. A tax statute provided that every 
person ''shall be deemed'' to have died a resident 
of New York upon living in N.Y. the greater part 
of any 12 consecutive months in the 24 months 
next preceding his death. Held this merely raised 
a presumption which could be overcome by proof 
that decedent was not in fact a resident. 
Kleepe vs. Odin tp., McHenry County, N.D. 
169 N.W. 313. Held that the language "and in 
case the board having jurisdiction shall fail to 
file such order within 20 days they shall be deemed 
to have decided against such application'' raised 
a rebuttable presumption "that can be overcome 
with evidence to the contrary.'' 
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Cooper vs. Slaughter, 57 So. 477. Jury was 
charged that if it believed that a boundary line, 
the location of which was involved in the action, 
was in dispute and that the adjoining owners 
caused it to be established and acquiesced in the 
line as established the plaintiff would be ''deem-
ed'' the owners. Held that ''deemed'' as there 
used was U1e equivalent of ''presumed.'' The ap-
pellant argued on appeal that the jury luid been 
erroneously instructed that as a matter of law the 
plaintiff would be the owner, because the word 
deemed meant "considered" or "adjudged." 
Bar.rell vs. Pittsburg, 62 Pa. St. 474. "But 
after the death of the husband the wife's legal 
settlement shall be deemed to be the place where 
he was last legally settled. 'l1his is equivalent to 
the expression 'shall be taken to be' and admits 
of the existence of a different state of facts, 
namely, a settlement acquired by a widow her-
self.'' To the same effect see Miffin vs. Elizabeth 
18 Pa. St. 17. 
J,ackson vs. SuccessiJon, 47 La. Am. 1089. A 
statute said that a legacy made to a creditor 
should not be deemed to be in compensation of the 
debt nor a legacy to a servant to be deemed to be 
in payment of wages. The court said: "The word 
deemed, used in the article simply means no 
interpretation unfavorable to a creditor shall be 
placed on the testament by the fact alone of the 
legacy to the creditor. It is a question of interpre-
tation.'' 
The above cases are representative of the many 
cases holding that the lan!,'llage "shall be deemed" 
raises only a prima facie presumption which is subject to 
rebutal. In each of the above cases it had been argued 
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McElroy 21 p. 2d, 80, 37 N. M. 238, it was held that where 
a statute deems a thing denied it is adjudged denired. 
From the above cases and dictionary definitions it 
is clear that two distinct meanings have been given to the 
term. 1'l'he one meaning is that it but raised a prima 
facie presumption or supposes a thing to be true. The 
other considers the word to raise a conclusive presump-
tion. ·which meaning is to be adopted in any particular 
case depends upon ordinary rules of statutory construc-
tion. The word itself has no clear cut definite meaning 
to be given in all cases. Clearly from the cases it is sus-
ceptible of more than one meaning. Whether in a given 
case the presumption it raises is prima facie or conclu-
sive cannot be answered merely by noting the use of the 
word. Other rules of statutory construction must be used 
because the word "deemed" has no set and definite 
meaning. 1t is worthy of note that if the legislature had 
intended the word "deemed" as conclusive there was no 
occasion to use the word "deemed" at all. It could have 
provided that water represented by shares of stock in a 
corporation shall not be appurtenant to land. It did not 
so provide, apparently because it did not so intend. 
It will be noted that the provisions of U.C.A. 1943, 
100-1-10 deals solely with a conveyance of a water right 
independent of conveyance of land. The apparent pur-
pose was to overcome any inference that may be drawn 
from the East River Bottom case that a water right 
represented by a certificate of stock could not be trans-
ferred by a transfer of the stock. 
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OF THE TWO RECOGNIZJ1JD 1\LE~ANINGS FOR THE 
'VOHD "DEEMED" THE COUHT IN CONSTRUING 
THE 1943 l}MIDNDMEN'l' TO SECrrlON 100-1-10 
?liUST HOLD THAT TT RAISES ONLY A PRIMA 
FACHJ PHESUMPTTON. 
It is universally recognized and established that the 
articles of incorporation constitute a contract; (a) he-
tween the corporation and the state; (b) between the 
corporation and the stockholders; (c) between the stock-
holders and the state; (d) between the state and third 
persons who have dealt with the corporation on the 
faith of the grant; (e) between the stockholders them-
selves. Thompson on Corporations, 3rd Ed., Vol. 1, page 
417. In Carey vs. Min. Co., 32Ut. 497, 91.P. 369, 12 L.R.A. 
(N.S.) 554, it is said: 
"The charter of a corporation having capital 
stock is a contract between three parties and 
forms the basis of three distinct contracts. The 
charter is a contract between the state and the 
corporation; second, it is a contract between the 
corporation and the stockholders; third, it is a 
contract between the stockholders and the state." 
When the individual farmer joined a mutual corpor-
ation to distribute and manage his water, he did not con-
tract, according to the existing Utah cases, to sever his 
water from his land so t,hat it would no longer be appur-
tenant. His contract was of such a nature that the water 
remained appurtenant even though represented by stock. 
This was recognized by the case cited above including 
two most recent Utah cases, East River Bottom vs. Boyce, 
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102 Utah 149; 128 P. 2d 277, and Milford State Bank vs. 
West Field Canal & Irr. Co., 108 Utah 528, 162 P. 2d, 101. 
It is uniformly held by all the cases that a statute 
which materially changes the contract made by the stock-
holders in the articles of incorporation is an impairment 
of the obligation of contract within the meaning of the 
constitutional limitations contained in both the state and 
federal constitutions. See Fletche.r on Corporation, Vol. 
7, Sec 3657; Garey vs. Mining Company, 32 Ut. 497, 91 P. 
369, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 554; Superio'r Water, Light and 
Power vs. Ci.ty of Superior, 263 U.S. 125, 68 L. Ed. 204, 
44 S. Ct. 82. 
If then it be admitted, as well it must, that many of 
the mutual companies had articles which left the water 
still appurtenant to the land upon which used, the legis-
lature would have no constitutional power to enact a 
statute which would impair this relationship and change 
it by severing water which the stockholders had chosen 
to leave appurtenant to land, from the land. That this 
would be so is clearly demonstrated by our Utah Supreme 
Court in the Carey vs. Mining Company case supra. 
(There is much good language in this case. We quote 
only a small portion of the discussion. Cases from many 
states·are cited and quoted from): 
''In the case of DMtmouth Colleg,e vs. Wood-
ward, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 518, 4 L. Ed. 629, it was 
held that the charter from a state to a private 
corporation created a contract within the mean-
ing of the federal constitution, forbidding any 
state to pass any law impairing the obligation of 
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contracts, and hence the federal Constitution pre-
vented a change by legislative enactment of a 
charter so issued.'' 
"From the texts and the cases it will be seen 
that under the reservation the state is not only 
unathorized to alter or amend charters of existing 
corporations in such a way as will change the 
fundamental character of the corporation, impair 
the object of the grant, or rights vested there-
under, but it is also unauthorized to alter or amend 
them in such a way as will impair the contractual 
relations or rights of the stockholders among 
themselves, or between the corporation and its 
stockholders; and it will also be seen that under 
the reserved power the Legislature has only the 
right to amend the charter, or laws with respect 
thereto, which it would have had in the event it 
had been decided in the Dartmouth College Case 
that the federal Constitution did not apply to cor-
porate charters. The Dartmouth College case did 
not call in question nor involve any right or rela-
tion of the corporators among themselves. It in-
volved only the relation of the corporation and the 
state. Without the reservation it was held that 
even such relation cannot be changed without 
doing violence to the federal Constitution. Be-
cause of the reserved power the state many now 
amend or alter the charter, so far as affecting the 
contract with itself, and so long as it does not 
change the fundamental character of the corpora-
tion or impair any vested rights acquired there-
under. But, as stated by the authorities, the right 
is reserved for the benefit of the state and of the 
public and for public purposes. The power can 
only be exercised to the extent that the state is in-
terested.'' 
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''Bearing in mind that the corporate charter 
is a dual contract--one between the state and the 
corporation and its stockholders, the other be-
tween the corporation and its stockholders--and 
that under the reserved power the state may alter 
or amend the former, but not the latter, the ques-
tion is: Under which do the legislative enactment 
of 19:~0 and the action taken by the majority of 
the stockholders fall? We are of the opinion that 
they do not pertain to any right, privilege, or im-
munity which the state had granted to the corpor-
ation or to its stockholders,and that the action by 
such stockholders in no wise affected or was re-
lated to the contract existing between the state 
and the corporation. It merely pertains to and 
affech; the contract existing among the stock-
holders themselves.'' 
''In the original articles of incorporation each 
Htockholder agreed, one with the other, that hiH 
full-paid capital stock should be nonassesHahle. 
'l'his proviHion might have been omitted or in-
serted as the corporatorH saw fit to agree among 
themselves. Neither the state nor the publie were 
eoncerned, whether they agreed upon one or the 
other. No franchise or privilege granted by the 
state to the defendant or its members was depen-
dent upon this provision. The same grant, fran-
chise, and privileges would have been granted had 
the provision been omitted. Had it been omitted, 
no other or greater liability would have been 
created in favor of the creditors or the public 
than was created by its insertion. Such a stipu-
lation did not, then, in any wise pertain to the 
contract between the state and the corporation. 
It waH manifestly intended to concern and fix the 
reciprocal rights of the stockholders among them-
Helves, and to place a limit upon the amount of 
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money or capital that each was required to put 
into the enterprise and contribute to the corpor-
ation. The whole consideration for the agreement 
that no further contribution of capital to the 
corporation should be exacted was the mutual 
promise of the stockholders, the one to the other. 
Neither the state nor the public had anything to 
do with it, nor was either in any wise concerned 
therewith. The corporators had the undoubted 
right, as among themselves, to stipulate and 
agree as to the extent of their contributions.'' 
f;inee a construction that the legislature intended by 
use of the word "deemed" to raise a conclusive pre-
sumption that :-;tock in a water company could not be 
appurtenant to land would be of doubtful constitution-
ality, the court should adopt the other construction, that 
there is merely a presumption that it is not appurten-
ant. The legislature would not have the power, and com-
mon sen:-;e <lictates that the court not impute to the legis-
lature the intent to sever water which was in fact ap-
purtenant to the land. The stockholders in organizing 
mutual companies elected to leave their water rights 
appurtenant to their lands. rrhousands of mutual com-
panies were organized all over the west. Courts from 
every western state have held that the water in such 
mutual companies is held by the stockholders as tenants 
in common--that it is in most cases still appurtenant to 
the land upon which used. No legislature could impair the 
obligation of contract and defeat the stockholders intent 
to have the water remain appurtenant. 
1'he legislature was without authority to deprive 
.John Edison Spencer of the water right conveyed to 
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him in 19i33 by both the certificate numbered 73 and the 
deed. (See John Edison Spencer's Exhibit 12). Such an 
attempt would offend against Article One, Section 10 
and the 5th and 14th Amendment of the Constitution 
of the United States and Article 1, Section 7 and 18 of 
the Constitution of Utah. Tn this connection see also 
deed to :f;Jlizabeth A. Tibbs copied into the transcript at 
pages 35-61. 
It is a well established rule of statutory construction 
that if one possible construction would render a statute 
of doubtful constitutionality and another equally logical 
construction would leave the constitutionality of the 
statute free from doubt, the courts should adopt the 
latter construction. The legislature may constitutionally 
raise a presumption that water represented by stock in a 
corporation is not appurtenant. It could not as to com-
panies already organized conclusively presume that the 
water was not appurtenant to the land. The court should 
therefore adopt the view that the language of the sta-
tute means at most only that it will be presumed that 
water represented by stock is not appurtenant, but that 
this presumption can be rebutted. 
In this case the evidence is all to the effect that the 
water right in dispute was at all times used on the land 
owned by Spencer and his successors in interest, and 
therefore the same was appurtenant to such lands. 
It will also be noted that the amendment of 1943 
does not have any retroactive effect. See U.C.A. 1943, 
88-2-3. The certificates of stock here involved were all 
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issued before the amendment of 1943. See also cases 
cited in foot notes to U.C.A. 1943, 88-2-3. 
''Certificates of stock, together with the 
charter or articles of incorporation and the sta-
tute under which the corporation was organized 
are evidence of a contract between the corporation 
and the persons named therein or subsequent 
holders thereof by proper assignment or transfer 
and between the various stockholders, etc." 14 
C. J. page 479, Sec. 699 and 18 C.J.S. page 723, 
Sec. 258, subdivision, (b). 
INDEPENDENT OF THE LAW AS TO APPURTEN-
ANCY OF \VATER TO LAND EDISON SP:BJNCF_jR 
AND ELIZABFJTH A. 'riBBS OWN THE WATER 
RJ1_j PRF}SENTED BY THE CERTIFICATES. 
Of the 448 acres of water right decreed to Richard 
H. Spencer there are now outstanding the following 
certificates: No. 8G for 160 shares, 84 for 125 shares, 7:-l 
for 80 shares, 72 for 80 shares and 3 acres of uncertifi-
eated water right; total 448 acres or shares. 
Under the evidence in this case there can be no 
serious doubt about Edison Spencer being the owner of 
certificates numbered 73 for 80 shares of stock and certi-
ficate numbered 86 for 160 shares of stock. 
As to certificate numbered 73 it recites that Edison 
Spencer is the pledgee. The evidence further shows that 
it was delivered to Irwin M. Price as security for money 
borrowed from Price by Richard H. Spencer. If and 
when the loan was paid by Richard H. Spencer to Irwin 
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M. Price the title to certificate numbered 73 which was 
given by Edison to Price to secure his father's loan re-
verted to EJdison. Richard H. Spencer could not acquire 
title to the certificate thus loaned to him to secure his ob-
ligation by the process of paying off the loan. There is 
nothing in that certificate which even remotely shows 
that Richard H. Spencer has any right, title or interest 
therein. Price having disclaimed any interest in that 
certificate the same belongs to Edison Spencer. 
l\loreover in 1933 R. H. Spencer by warranty deed 
conveyed 80 shares of water in Thistle Creek to John 
Edison Spencer (See John Edison Spencer Exhibit 12). 
That one may convey a certificate of stock by any writ-
ing not on the certificate itself is provided by U.C.A. 
1943, 18-3-1 and 1943, 18-3-16. 
What has been said about the ownership of certifi-
cate numbered 73 applies to certificate 86 for 160 shares 
of stock. That certificate has been assigned to Edison 
and the land upon which the same has been and is being 
used has been conveyed to Edison who in consideration 
of such transfer and conveyance assumed and paid off 
the obligation that stood against the certificate and land 
at the time the conveyance was made. 
As to certificate 72 for 80 shares a slightly different 
question is presented. The evidence shows that such 
eertificate was during the course of this litigation for 
the most part in the possession of counsel for Edison 
Spencer, Richard H. Spencer and Irwin M. Price. A 
futile attempt was made at the trial to show that Irwin 
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M. Price had not employed counsel. We shall not enlarge 
upon what we have already said with respect to the 
affidavit of Price which, of course, was not competent 
evidence, except to show that he did not claim any water 
right. 
As to certificate numbered 72 the evidence without 
dispute shows that R. H. Spencer so far as he was able 
to do gave the water represented by such certificate to 
1\irs. Tibbs, not only by conveying to Mrs. Tibbs the 
land upon which the water was used but by word of 
mouth. He also gave Mrs. Tibbs a deed in which he 
conveyed to her 20 shares of primary water right. The 
deed is dated May 21, 1931. (Tr. 35). The evidence fur-
ther shows that Richard H. Spencer was enjoined from 
transferring any water right. It may well be that the 
injunction in such particular was a nullity, but Richard 
H. Spencer could not be expected to take the chance of 
being punished for contempt if and when he made a for-
mal transfer of the water. It is contended by plaintiff, 
to which contention we do not agree, that Richard H. 
Spencer did not claim such water right is conclusively 
made evident by the fact that as late as 1944 he dis-
claimed any and all right to the water represented by 
such certificate. If, as the plaintiff claims, Richard H. 
Spencer solemnly disclaimed any and all interest in 
eertificate numbered 72 in 1944 it is indeed difficult to 
concieve of any law that would 'Permit the administrator 
of his estate to successfully maintain a claim that he had 
~mch an interest. In this connection it will be recalled 
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that there is a total absence of any evidence showing or 
tending to show that Richard H. Spencer acquired any 
right, title or interest in certificate numbered 72 and 73 
since he filed his disclaimer in this action. The adminis-
trator of the estate of Richard H. Spencer having offered 
in evidence the affidavit of Price to the effect that Price 
relinquished aU right he had in certificates numbered 
72and 73 in 1941 it follows that if R. H. Spencer did 
make the disclaimer a.s contended for by the plaintiff 
the administrator could not successfully set aside such 
disclaimer. Therefore if, as appears, Price relinquished 
his claim to certificates numbered 72 and 73 in 1941 and 
if as plaintiff contends Richard H. Spencer disclaimed 
any interest in certificates numbered 72 and 73 in 1944 
and there is no evidence whatsover that Richard H. 
Spencer has acquired any interest in certificates 72 and 
73 since he made his alleged disclaimer in 1944 it neces-
sarily follows that the ~dministrator of the estate of 
Richard H. Spencer has completely failed to show any 
title or interest in either certificates 72 or 73. 
On the other hand the evidence shows without eon-
flict that Edison Spencer had an agreement with Irwin 
M. Price in .July, 1946 just after the death of Richard H. 
Spencer wherein and whereby Edison Spencer agreed to 
carry on the litigation then pending in court to clear 
up the title to such certificate to pay the costs of such 
litigation and if successful to pay to Bonnie, the minor 
daughter of Irwin M. Price, the sum of $1000.00 and 
transfer certificate 72 to his sister, Mrs. Tibbs, and that 
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such arrangement had received the approval of Richard 
H. Spencer prior to his death. That Edison Spencer is 
carrying out his part of such agreement is obvious in 
that he is prosecuting this action notwithstanding if he 
is successful he will be out the expenses he is put to in 
so doing and will not even if successful receive the water 
right represented by certificate numbered 72. 
Coming now to certificate numbered 84. The evi-
dence shows that such certificate was delivered to Edison 
Spencer by his father prior to his death; that Edison 
took the certificate to Mr. Houtz, the secretary of the 
Indianola Irrigation Company, to have the same trans-
ferred but the secretary refused to transfer the same. 
There is language in the decree entered in case numbered 
2888 which seems to enjoin Richard H. Spencer from 
transferring any water rights. We doubt that the court 
had jurisdiction to issue such injunction but it may be 
that Richard H. Spencer hesitated to make any transfer 
of such certificate or any certificate for fear that he 
might be cited into court for contempt. 
During the course of the trial counsel for the admin-
istrator of the estate of Richard H. Spencer attempted 
to impeach the testimony of Mrs. Louise Spencer, the 
wife of Edison, by reading to her some purported testi-
mony given at the time of the hearing had on the petition 
to appoint an administrator and on the hearing had in 
the proceedings wherein it was sought to ascertain the 
nature and amount of property owned by Richard H. 
Spencer at the time of his death. In such former pro-
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ceeding Mrs. Spencer gave evidence touching the papers 
that were delivered by Richard H. Spencer to his son 
FJdison and Mrs. Tibbs after the same were received from 
Mr. Beal. It was such papers that were apparently being 
inquired about. The fact that Mrs. Spencer testified that 
no other papers were then delivered may not be said to 
detract from her testimony. She was not asked about any 
water certificate; that she had in mind the deeds and 
papers brought from Mr. Beal's office is made evident 
by the fact that she did not mention the assignment of 
the ear mark which assignment was executed at about 
that time. Moreover the circumstances surrounding the 
delivery of the deeds and the certificate for 125 shares 
tends to corroborate the testimony of Edison Spencer 
and his wife. 
It is difficult to concieve of Mr. Spencer, the father, 
transferring to his daughter and son the land which he 
conveyed to them and then make such land worth only a 
fractional part of what they are worth as irrigated 
land by withholding the water right used thereon. Such 
a transaction is contrary to all human experience. The 
evidence shows that the land in question was of the prob-
able value of $100.00 per acre with a water right and 
from $10.00 to $20.00 without a water right. (Tr. 814 to 
818 and 820 to 821) It is submitted that it is extremely 
improbable that Richard H. Spencer intended any such 
results on the eve of his passing away. 
Moreover the record shows that Richard H. Spencer 
had had considerable trouble and litigation touching his 
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water rights. It is difficult to concieve of Mr. Spencer, 
the elder, not making some provision of the manner in 
which such water rights should be disposed of if and 
when the same could be transferred. In this connection 
the attention of the court is directed to U.C.A. 1943, 18-3-
9 wherein it is provided: 
''The delivery of a certificate by the person 
appeming by the certificate to be the owner there-
of without the indorsement requisite for the trans-
fer of the certificate· and the shares represented 
thereby but with intent to transfer such certifi-
cate or shares·shall impose an obligation, in the 
absence of an agreement to the contrary, upon 
the person so delivering to complete the transfe·r 
by making the necessary indorsement. The trans-
fer shall take effect as of the time when the in-
dorsement is actually made. This obligation may 
be specifically enforced.'' 
Thus if, as the evidence shows, stock certificate No. 
84 was delivered to Edison Spencer with the intention 
that he should have the water represented thereby then 
it follows that he is entitled to the water represented 
thereby. See also in this connection U.C.A. 1943, 18-3-10. 
If it be said that Edison disclaimed the right to 
certificate numbered 73 in the disclaimer filed in 1944, 
the same as did his father, it will be noted that at that 
time the stock certificate appeared to be owned by Price; 
that Price was willing to relinquish his claim thereto 
only on condition that Edison pay to Bonnie, the daugh-
ter of Price, the sum of $1000.00 and deliver certificate 
No. 72 to Mrs. Tibbs. It was after the disclaimer filed 
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in 1944 that Edison made the agreement with Price. In 
this connection the attention of the court is directed to 
the testimony ·of Edison at the time of the hearing of 
the petition for the appointment of an administrator and 
the proceeding had for the discovery of the assets of the 
estate. The fact should not be overlooked that Elizabeth 
A. Tibbs kept house for her father for many years. (Tr. 
879) and that John Edison Spencer, who was 42 years 
of age at the time of the trial, had spent his matured 
years in helping his father to acquire and save the pro-
perty which he owned at the time of his death. (Tr. 597) 
At the trial counsel for the administrator seemed to 
place considerable stress on the evidence of Edison at 
the time proceedings were had for the appointment of an 
administrator to the effect that he claimed only some 
three acres of uncertified water. Doubtless .BJdison had 
in mind the water right to which he had the legal title. 
Nothing could possibly be gained by I<Jdison representing 
that he disclaimed the right to acquire the legal title to 
the water right which he now claims. There could be no 
conceivable reason for him to disclaim the right to pursue 
his legal right to acquire the water right which he is here 
seeking. 
In conclusion it is the contention of Edison Spencer 
and J1Jlizabeth A. Tibbs: 
l. That the Hadlock mortgage IS void for uncer-
tainity. 
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2. rl'hat the decree of foreclosure is void for am-
biguity and uncertainity in so far as it relates to 60 
:-;hares or acres of water. 
:~. That the plaintiff herein may not, under the 
guise of a suit to quiet title, in effect amend, modify or 
render certain either the Hadlock mortgage or the decree 
of foreclosure in case 2888 civil, because: 
(a) The court is without power at this late date to 
in effect modify, amend or render certain such decree. 
(h) That the plaintiff not being a party to the 
mortgage foreclosure proceeding may not be heard to 
complain about its terms. 
(c) That the only evidence permissible to ascertain 
the meaning of the decree of foreclosure is the judgment 
roll itself and such judgment roll is fatally defective in 
that it does no.t disclose the subject matter of the fore-
closure proceedings. 
(d) That there is no pleading in the Hadlock com-
plaint to foreclose on any particular shares or acres of 
water right. 
4. That the deed made by Spencer and his wife to 
the Indianola Irrigation Company is void for uncertain-
ity. 
5. That in any event the decree entered in this cas·e 
may not be affirmed because it awards to the plaintiff 
and Hugentobler more wa:ter than they are entitled to 
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and hy such decree all of the water rights in Thistle 
Creek and it tributaries are clouded. 
6. That the water right represented by the certifi-
cates of stock is appurtenant to the land upon which 
such water right is ancl has been used, which lancl now is 
ownecl by Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs. 
7. 'l'hat even if it should be held, contrary to our 
contention, that the water right represented by tho cer-
tificates is not appurtenant to the land EJdison Spencer 
and Elizabeth A. 'l'ibhs are the equitable owners of such 
certificates and entitled to have their titles thereto 
quieted, provided, that .John Edison Spencer shall when 
such title i:-; (iUieted, pay to Bonnie, the minor daughter 
of T rwin l\L Price, the sum of $1000 and transfer certifi-
cate No. 72 to Elizabeth A. Tibbs. 
8. '!'hat the administrator of the estate of Richard 
H. Spencer has completely failed to establish any inter-
est in any of the water right in question. 
9. That the jndt,'lnent for costs awarded against 
John ~1Jdison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs should 
he reversed. 
10. That J1Jdison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs 
are entitled to a judgment. for their costs herein ex-
pended. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Elias Hansen 
Attorney for Defendents and 
a,ppellants, John Edison Spencer 
and Elizabeth A. Tibbs 
